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SHOULD COMPETITION POLICY 
PROMOTE HAPPINESS? 
Maurice E. Stucke* 
 
What, if anything, are the implications of the happiness economics 
literature on competition policy?  This Article first examines whether 
competition policy should promote (or at least not impede) citizens’ 
opportunities to increase well-being.  It next surveys the happiness 
literature on five key issues:  (i) What constitutes well-being; (ii) How do 
you measure well-being; (iii) What increases well-being; (iv) Do people 
want to be happy; and (v) Can and should the government promote total 
well-being?  Although the happiness literature does not provide an 
analytical framework for analyzing routine antitrust issues, this does not 
mean that competition officials should discount or ignore the literature 
altogether.  The findings of the happiness literature, as this Article argues, 
offer some helpful insights on the current debate over antitrust’s goals.  The 
literature suggests that competition policy in a post-industrial wealthy 
country would get more bang (in terms of increased well-being) in 
promoting economic, social, and democratic values, rather than simply 
promoting a narrowly defined consumer welfare objective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even the free market’s most stalwart defenders are concerned that 
capitalism is in crisis.1  A Bank of England official recently observed that 
 
 1. See, e.g., Joseph L. Bower et al., Global Capitalism at Risk:  What Are You Doing 
About It?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2011, at 104, 106; Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, 
Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62, 64 (capitalist system is 
“under siege”); Joseph L. Bower et al., Occupy Wall Street Protestors Have a Point, HARV. 
BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 15, 2012), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6956
.html?wknews=02152012 (noting that Occupy Wall Street’s concerns “are not very different 
from the concerns” the authors heard when talking to “business leaders around the world 
about the problems they thought might constitute material threats to the sustainability of 
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“Occupy has been successful in its efforts to popularise the problems of the 
global financial system for one very simple reason:  they are right.”2  Our 
economic thinking, remarked the Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OECD) Executive Director, “has been distorted by the 
overwhelming power of vested interests in the financial sector.”3  The 
economic crisis tarnished the ideology of self-regulating, correcting markets 
yielding efficient outcomes with little government intrusion.4  The 
misguided economic policies preceding the current crisis left many nations 
with daunting challenges, including increasing income inequality, climate 
change, lower potential output, higher total and long-term unemployment, 
mounting public and private debt, and volatile capital markets.5 
Policymakers are also reconsidering the objectives of their economic 
policies.  The neoclassical, pre-crisis economic model “that privileged pure 
efficiency and output can no longer be relied on for designing and 
evaluating new broader policies, or for measuring a country’s overall 
performance.”6  Improving quality of life is now a popular goal, and 
understanding the trade-offs and side-effects of different policy options is 
an important policy consideration.7 
 
market capitalism”); Frank Kane, Capitalism Crisis a Big Part of Davos Forum, NATIONAL 
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/
economics/capitalism-crisis-a-big-part-of-davos-forum.  In one recent survey, Republicans 
responded most favorably to “capitalism,” with 62 percent reacting positively, compared 
with 29 percent responding negatively; meanwhile, 52 percent of independents reacted 
positively compared to 39 percent negatively; 47 percent of Democrats reacted positively 
compared to 43 percent negatively; and Americans younger than thirty responded least 
favorably to capitalism with 43 percent responding positively compared to 48 percent 
reacting negatively. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, “SOCIALISM” NOT SO 
NEGATIVE, “CAPITALISM” NOT SO POSITIVE:  A POLITICAL RHETORIC TEST (2010), available 
at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1583/political-rhetoric-capitalism-socialism-militia-family-
values-states-rights. 
 2. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the Fin. Pol’y Comm., 
A Leaf Being Turned, Speech at Friend’s House, Euston, London 2 (Oct. 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/
speech616.pdf; see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY:  HOW TODAY’S 
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE xi (2012). 
 3. Robert A. Johnson, A Pathway to Sound Economic Thinking, OECD OBSERVER, 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3763/A_pathway_to_sound_economic_
thinking.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY:  RECKLESS 
FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 71 (2008) 
(identifying ten recurring characteristics of U.S. capitalist heyday booms). 
 4. See JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET:  A HISTORY OF RISK, 
REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 247–308 (2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE 
OF CAPITALISM:  THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 113–16, 134–35, 
236, 243, 259–60, 274 (2009). 
 5. Pier Carlo Padoan, A New Vision of Growth and Well-Being, OECD OBSERVER, 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3762/A_new_vision_of_growth_and_
well-being.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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So, too, should policymakers reassess antitrust’s goals.  The quest of 
uniting competition policy under a single economic goal has failed.8  As 
other countries’ experience reflects, competition law has had, and will 
always have, multiple economic, political, social, and moral objectives.9  So 
where should policymakers turn next for antitrust’s goals?  One unexplored 
area is whether competition policy should promote a multidimensional 
welfare function that includes subjective well-being. 
As St. Augustine observed, “It is the decided opinion of all who use their 
brains, that all men desire to be happy.”10  But the questions who are happy, 
or how do they become so, he wrote, have stirred “endless and angry 
controversies, in which philosophers have wasted their strength and 
expended their leisure.”11  Today, one would add psychologists, 
economists, and legal scholars to the mix.  The happiness literature is a hot 
stock in academia and policy centers, with books;12 law, economic, and 
newspaper articles;13 and academic journals studying happiness.14 
Policymakers are taking note.  As Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke 
recently said, “The ultimate purpose of economics, of course, is to 
understand and promote the enhancement of well-being.  Economic 
measurement accordingly must encompass measures of well-being and its 
determinants.”15  France’s Nicolas Sarkozy created a commission, headed 
 
 8. See Maurice E. Stucke, Greater International Convergence and the Behavioural 
Antitrust Gambit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 175–79 
(Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 551, 568 (2012) [hereinafter Stucke, Goals]. 
 9. Stucke, Goals, supra note 8, at 595. 
 10. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD ch. 10, § 1, at 303 (Modern Library 1993). 
 11. Id.  
 12. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS:  WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN 
FROM THE NEW RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING (2010); BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS:  A 
REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS (2008); DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); 
CAROL GRAHAM, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS:  AN ECONOMY OF WELL-BEING (2011); 
JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS:  FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT 
WISDOM (2006); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS:  LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005); 
DANIEL NETTLE, HAPPINESS:  THE SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR SMILE (2005); WELL-BEING:  THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
 13. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Regulation, Deregulation, and Happiness, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2369, 2370 (2011); Peter H. Huang, Happiness in Business or Law, 12 
TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 153 (2011) [hereinafter Huang, Happiness in Business]; 
Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 21.1–
.28 (2010) [hereinafter Huang, Happiness Studies] (collecting articles); Teresa Amabile & 
Steven Kramer, Do Happier People Work Harder?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at 7 (Week in 
Review); Catherine Rampell, America’s Happiest Man, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at 3 
(Week in Review); Wendy Koch, If Money Doesn’t Buy Happiness, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 
2012, 11:55 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/2012-08-02-Gross-
national-happiness_CV_U.htm. 
 14. Included among the many journals studying happiness are:  Applied Research in 
Quality of Life; Journal of Happiness Studies; International Journal of Happiness & 
Development; and International Journal of Wellbeing. 
 15. Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the 
32nd Gen. Conf. of the Int’l Ass’n for Research in Income & Wealth, Cambridge, Mass. (via 
prerecorded video) (Aug. 6, 2012), 2012 WL 3192727; see also Mark Easton, The Politics of 
Happiness, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2006, 17:36 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
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by Professors Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, that 
ultimately recommended shifting “emphasis from measuring economic 
production to measuring people’s well-being.”16  Measuring well-being, for 
the OECD, “has been and will continue to be a key priority.”17  Bhutan uses 
a Gross National Happiness Index.18  Eurostat (the European Union’s 
statistical office),19 and many other jurisdictions currently are developing 
matrices for assessing subjective well-being.20  In 2011, the United 
Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics included for the first time 
subjective well-being questions in its surveys: 
It is increasingly understood that traditional economic measures of 
progress are necessary but not sufficient to reflect a nation’s overall 
progress or well-being. . . .  
There has been increasing interest in the UK and around the world in 
using wider measures of well-being to monitor progress and evaluate 
policy, to focus on quality of life and the environment, as well as 
economic growth, in assessing progress.21 
What, if anything, are the implications of the happiness economics 
literature on competition policy?  Part I of this Article establishes why 
competition law should promote (or at least not impede) citizens’ 
opportunities to increase well-being.  With this premise, Part II surveys the 
happiness economics literature on five key issues:  (i) What constitutes 
well-being; (ii) How do you measure well-being; (iii) What increases well-
being; (iv) Do people want to be happy; and (v) Can and should the 
 
programmes/happiness_formula/4809828.stm (quoting David Cameron:  “We should be 
thinking not just what is good for putting money in people’s pockets but what is good for 
putting joy in people’s hearts.”). 
 16. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 12 (2009) [hereinafter CMEPSP REPORT], 
available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf. 
 17. OECD, HOW’S LIFE?:  MEASURING WELL-BEING 15 (2011), available at 
http://wwwu.uni-klu.ac.at/nwohlgem/makrooekonomik/topics/How%20is%20life.%20
measuring%20wellbeing.pdf.  The OECD, among others, are arguing for a “multi-
dimensional welfare function” that promotes sustainable growth and innovation, and 
improves overall material well-being and quality of life. See id. 
 18. Bhutan GNH Index, GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS, http://www.grossnational
happiness.com/articles/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (identifying the kingdom’s nine domains 
for its index: psychological well-being, health, education, time use, cultural diversity and 
resilience, good governance, community vitality, ecological diversity and resilience, and 
living standards). 
 19. EUROSTAT, FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR WELL-BEING INDICATORS:  TASK 4:  CRITICAL 
REVIEW (2009), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/gdp_and_
beyond/documents/Feasibility_study_Well-Being_Indicators.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 
2013). 
 20. Id. § 2.1–.9 (describing several recent and significant developments in measuring 
well-being); see also Christopher Meyer & Julia Kirby, Runaway Capitalism, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 66, 71 (noting that forty-one countries have initiatives to measure 
happiness). 
 21. News Release, U.K. Office of Nat’l Statistics, Update on the ONS Measuring 
National Well-Being Programme (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/
ons/dcp29904_255640.pdf. 
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government promote total well-being?  As Part II concludes, the happiness 
literature has not reached the point where it can reorient antitrust’s legal 
standards toward promoting total well-being.  
 But, as Part III discusses, the happiness literature can inform the current 
debate over whether competition policy in wealthy societies should 
primarily maximize consumer surplus or also promote political, moral, and 
social objectives.  As this part examines, competition policy never arose to 
promote only one economic objective, such as consumer surplus.  Antitrust 
historically sought to promote political, social, and moral values of fair 
competition, dispersal of economic power, and promoting individual 
autonomy.  Despite the historical concerns about concentrated economic 
power, antitrust analysis over the past thirty years overstated the importance 
of competitive dynamics that were easier to assess (productive efficiencies 
and short-term price effects) and marginalized or ignored what was harder 
to assess (dynamic efficiencies; systemic risk; and the political, social, and 
moral implications of concentrated economic power).  Americans paid the 
price.  One benefit of the happiness literature is exposing why a competition 
policy that seeks primarily to promote consumer surplus is unlikely to 
increase total well-being.  The United States, after all, was founded on the 
premise that democracy can promote happiness.  And competition policy, in 
dispersing economic and political power and promoting economic 
opportunity and individual autonomy, can not only promote a democracy, 
but can also promote well-being for the many, rather than the few. 
I.  COMPETITION POLICY MUST PROMOTE (OR AT LEAST NOT IMPEDE) 
CITIZENS’ OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE WELL-BEING 
When the International Competition Network surveyed thirty-five of its 
member countries on the objectives of their monopoly laws, the most 
popular goal was ensuring an effective competitive process.22  Likewise, 
U.S. courts have observed that the “purpose of antitrust law, at least as 
articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive process.”23 
But surely this cannot be competition law’s sole or primary goal.  A 
competitive process is effective only if it promotes some other objectives.  
Competition’s value, for many, is not for its own sake but represents the 
means “to achieve broader government objectives for the economy or for a 
 
 22. UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON 
THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL 
MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 2, 6 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ICN 
REPORT], available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc
353.pdf  (“Respondents identified ten different objectives of unilateral conduct laws, 
regulations, and policies, with all but one member agency identifying more than one 
objective as relevant to their unilateral conduct regimes.”). 
 23. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Tal v. 
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 
958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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given industry.”24  Since an effective competitive process is not an end but 
the more efficient (or democratic) means to achieve other objectives, three 
consequences follow.  First, there must be one or more intermediate or 
ultimate goals of competition law.  Second, one must consider how, and 
under what circumstances, the competitive process can effectively promote 
these objectives.  And third, one must understand how the country’s formal 
and informal institutions can foster a competitive process that effectively 
promotes these ultimate objectives. 
What then is competition policy’s ultimate and proper end?  St. Thomas 
Aquinas and Aristotle, among others, argued that happiness is logically its 
own end.25  If happiness is a complete and self-sufficient end for many 
individuals, observed Bentham, then maximizing happiness is the proper 
end for government.26  Likewise, the Declaration of Independence 
identified as “a self-evident truth” that all men are endowed “by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness,” and recognized the people’s right to institute 
a new government, “laying its foundation on such principles and organizing 
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness.”27 
Consequently, if well-being is a complete and self-sufficient goal for 
individuals, and if promoting well-being is the proper (or at least a primary) 
end for government, then competition policy should promote (or at least not 
hinder) the community’s ability to maximize well-being. 
A.  Is Promoting Well-Being Too Much To Ask of Competition Policy? 
Some may question Bentham’s premise that promoting happiness should 
be every law’s general objective.  It is not apparent, for example, how the 
federal regulations on frozen cherry pies augment total well-being.28  Why 
should competition law bear this burden?  Modern antitrust theory says to 
 
 24. DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., OECD, BRINGING 
COMPETITION INTO REGULATED SECTORS:  THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/compcomm/2005-Roundtable%20on%20Bringing
%20Competition.pdf; see also UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., INT’L COMPETITION 
NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKBOOK CHAPTER 1:  THE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 
OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS 3 (Apr. 1, 2012) [hereinafter UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
WORKBOOK], available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc827.pdf (noting that there is an expectation that competition will tend to promote welfare 
and perhaps other policy objectives). 
 25. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, AQUINAS’S SHORTER SUMMA:  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS’S OWN 
CONCISE VERSION OF HIS SUMMA THEOLOGICA 353 (2002) (“[T]hat good which man chiefly 
and mainly desires must be of such a nature that it is not sought for the sake of something 
else and that it satisfies man.  This good is commonly called happiness.”); ARISTOTLE, THE 
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE:  NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 1, ch. 7, at 36 (J.A.K. Thompson trans., 
Penguin Books 1955).  
 26. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 13, § 1.1 
(Prometheus 1988) (1781) (“[G]eneral object which all laws have, or ought to have, in 
common, is to augment the total happiness of the community.”). 
 27. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 28. 21 C.F.R. § 152.126 (2012). 
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let competition policy improve the allocation of scarce resources, reduce the 
costs of goods and services, maximize overall wealth; and leave well-being 
to individual choice or other government policies.29 
Even if one disagrees with Bentham, some laws play a greater role in the 
economy and daily life.  One premise of many developed countries’ 
economic system of private enterprise is the importance of free 
competition.30  Competition and efficiency, an OECD official observed, are 
the “policy ‘glue’ that links and binds all economic and regulatory decision-
making into a coherent framework.”31  The Small Business Act’s policy 
declaration summarizes this philosophy: 
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise is free 
competition.  Only through full and free competition can free markets, 
free entry into business, and opportunities for the expression and growth 
of personal initiative and individual judgment be assured. The 
preservation and expansion of such competition is basic not only to the 
economic well-being but to the security of this Nation.32 
 Congress’s policy statement incorporates several important premises.  
First, competition does not exist independent of legal and informal 
institutions.  As economist R.H. Coase said, “[T]he legal system will have a 
profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in certain 
respects be said to control it.”33  Consequently, what makes the competitive 
process fair or unfair can vary depending upon these legal and informal 
institutions.34  The term “competition on the merits” invariably involves 
 
 29. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF (1978). 
 30. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION 
COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library
.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (“[F]ree-market competition is, 
and has long been, the fundamental economic policy of the United States.”); EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, COMPETITION: GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN EU COMPETITION POLICY:  ANTITRUST 
AND CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS 10 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf (describing “[f]air and undistorted competition” as 
“a cornerstone of a market economy”); NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS 
& PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 177 (1979); 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 1 (1955) (“Most Americans have long recognized that opportunity for free market 
access and fostering of market rivalry are basic tenets of our faith in competition as a form of 
economic organization.”); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002:  BUILDING 
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 133 (2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/12/13/000094946_99092312334240/R
endered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
 31. PAUL CRAMPTON, OECD, COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY AS ORGANISING PRINCIPLES 
FOR ALL ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY POLICYMAKING 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/2490195.pdf. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006). 
 33. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717–
18 (1992); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 38 (1944) (“[Competition] 
depends, above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed 
both to preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as possible.”). 
 34. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (empowering and directing the FTC to prevent 
persons from using “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
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normative considerations of unfair competition.35  The legal and informal 
institutions provide the rules of the game necessary for that type of 
competition to function effectively36 and thereby affect the market 
participants’ incentives.37  The institutional constraints determine, in part, 
the market’s performance.  The rules help define the opportunity set in the 
economy, and changing the rules can lead to different outcomes.38  For 
instance, if the law rewards (or is indifferent to) monopolization, 
monopolies will likely arise in markets conducive to monopolization.39 
Second, some types of competition (“full and free”) can augment total 
well-being.  Other types of competition, such as the “exploitation of child 
labor, the chiseling of workers’ wages, the stretching of workers’ hours, are 
not necessary, fair, or proper methods of competition”40 and hinder well-
being.41 
Third, competition can increase multiple dimensions of well-being, such 
as promoting material well-being and quality of life by increasing 
 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (“[The FTC] in measuring a practice against the elusive, but 
congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public 
values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the 
antitrust laws.”); HAYEK, supra note 33, at 36. 
 35. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
n.32 (1985) (defining exclusionary conduct as behavior that “not only (1) tends to impair the 
opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does 
so in an unnecessarily restrictive way” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588–89 (1957) (“The primary issue 
is whether du Pont’s commanding position as General Motors’ supplier of automotive 
finishes and fabrics was achieved on competitive merit alone, or because its acquisition of 
the General Motors’ stock, and the consequent close intercompany relationship, led to the 
insulation of most of the General Motors’ market from free competition, with the resultant 
likelihood, at the time of suit, of the creation of a monopoly . . . .”). 
 36. See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:  
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 232–65 (1998) (noting the ordoliberal concept of shaping rules for 
this market game so that only quality of performance (merit) determines “market success”); 
STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 52; Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and Maintaining 
Diversity Through Competition Law, in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW:  
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 15 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543725. 
 37. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 52, 158 
(2005) (“How the game is actually played is a consequence of the formal structure [e.g., 
formal rules, including those set by the government], the informal institutional constraints 
[e.g., societal norms and conventions], and the enforcement characteristics.”). 
 38. Kerber, supra note 36, at 16. 
 39. See NORTH, supra note 37, at 50. 
 40. 83 CONG. REC. 5994 (1938) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the 
Senate recommending the strengthening and enforcement of antitrust laws). 
 41. Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36–37 (1987) (construing 29 
U.S.C. § 202(a), where industries whose labor conditions are detrimental to the maintenance 
of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers constitute an unfair method of competition). 
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opportunities for expression, personal initiative, and individual judgment, 
thereby advancing our democratic ideals.42 
Accordingly, competition does not exist abstractly but is defined in part 
by legal institutions.  Legal institutions (including competition law)43 and 
informal ethical, moral, and social norms44 can promote well-being to the 
extent that they deter unfair competition and promote fair and free 
competition, free entry into business, and opportunities for the expression 
and growth of personal initiative.45  The stronger one’s faith in competition 
as a form of economic organization, the greater the role of legal and 
informal norms in promoting a competitive process that effectively 
augments total well-being.  For if “fair” competition reduces well-being and 
increases misery, citizens will inquire why their laws and informal norms 
promote this kind of competition, and why the incentives and regulatory 
framework cannot be altered for a fairer competitive process that will likely 
increase well-being. 
Consequently, competition law can play an important role in promoting 
fair competition by defining and deterring unfair competition, as well as by 
maintaining a competitive process that promotes other important 
democratic ideals.  The Supreme Court made this logical connection when 
 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 326 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(predicting that “the concentration of the sources of information of the American people in 
just a few dominant, collaborative conglomerates . . . would be inimical to the objective of a 
competitive market, the purposes of the antitrust laws, and the economic wellbeing of the 
American people”), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Tingsrätt [TR] [Stockholm 
District Court] ¶ 22 2011-02-17 C-52/09 (Swed.), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0052:EN:HTML (noting that the function 
of E.U. competition rules “is precisely to prevent competition from being distorted to the 
detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the 
well-being of the European Union”); EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 
2010 ¶ 32, at 11 (2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2011:0328:FIN:EN:PDF (discussing how competition policy takes into account 
the protection of the environment and sustainable growth). 
 43. Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 13 F.3d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(“[T]he fundamental objective of our antitrust laws is to promote fair competition for the 
benefit of all consumers.” (citing Seidenstein v. Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc., 769 F.2d 1100, 
1106 (5th Cir. 1985)); Kirkland v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 425 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 
1976) (noting that tort of unfair competition “is an equitable concept, resting on general 
principles of fairness in business practices”). 
 44. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE:  HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD 
PEOPLE (2011) (arguing that conscience is a powerful force for our economic, social, and 
political lives); Joseph Henrich et al., Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution 
of Fairness and Punishment, 327 SCIENCE 1480, 1480 (2010) (studying how informal 
religious norms can play an important role in supporting a competitive market economy). 
 45. For an evolutionary perspective of competition policy and the importance of 
fairness, see Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the 
Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust:  Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and 
Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011); Thomas J. Horton. Fairness 
and Antitrust Reconsidered:  An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1004&context=thomas_horton; Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard 
Antitrust Double Helix:  Applying Evolutionary Theory To Guard Competitors and Revive 
Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 615 (2012). 
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describing the competition laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise”:  the competition laws 
“are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our 
fundamental personal freedoms.”46 
B.  Does Competition Policy Reduce Misery        
Rather Than Increase Well-Being? 
Another objection to this Article’s initial premise follows Winston 
Churchill’s statement about democracy, namely that capitalism is the worst 
form of economy except all other forms that have been tried.47  Competition 
and a market economy do not promote well-being; they simply make us less 
miserable than other known economic systems.   
Even if competition promotes misery, policymakers can lessen the 
misery by prohibiting unfair methods of competition.  A competition policy 
that simply involves a rush for scarce resources—where many are trampled 
or left scrambling for the scraps—would appeal to the few who captured the 
resources. 
Consequently, whatever one’s competition policy objectives, 
“[e]conomic things matter only in so far as they make people happier.”48  If 
one’s antitrust goal were promoting consumer or total welfare, then what is 
welfare but “the state of doing well especially in respect to good fortune, 
happiness, well-being, or prosperity.”49  However defined, economic 
definitions of welfare typically extend beyond static price competition or 
efficiencies to subjective well-being.50  Even if one’s definition of welfare 
excluded subjective well-being, one confronts the issue of competition 
law’s ultimate aim.  Suppose that a country’s citizens’ physical and mental 
health deteriorates as a result of the country’s competition policy, the 
citizens’ isolation and distrust increase, and their freedom and self-
 
 46. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 47. Sir Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons (Nov. 1947), reprinted in 
THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS § 231(7), at 146 (1970) (“Democracy is the 
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to 
time.”). 
 48. Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic Performance, 107 ECON. J. 1815, 1815 
(1997); see also Huang, Happiness in Business, supra note 13, at 160. 
 49. Welfare, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
welfare (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 50. See, e.g., JOHN BLACK ET AL., OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2008), 
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199237043.001.0001/
acref-9780199237043-e-3354?rskey=QMJdVE&result=2&q=welfare (“The level of welfare 
measures the degree of contentment of an individual or a society.”); OECD, GLOSSARY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW 29, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf (“Consumer welfare refers to the individual 
benefits derived from the consumption of goods and services. In theory, individual welfare is 
defined by an individual’s own assessment of his/her satisfaction, given prices and 
income.”); Economics A to Z, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-
z/w#node-21529313 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“Economists use it to describe the well 
being of an individual or society, as in ‘Are tax cuts welfare-enhancing?’”). 
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determination decrease.  In such a case, competition officials and courts 
could not effectively advocate their competition policy as being “there to 
help us achieve economic prosperity and increase the welfare of society.”51 
II.  OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES IF COMPETITION POLICY SHOULD 
INCREASE TOTAL WELL-BEING 
Ultimately, as Part I argues, competition policy promotes fair 
competition while preserving economic freedom, with the ultimate aim of 
increasing total well-being.  In accepting this initial premise, policymakers 
confront five important issues:  first, what constitutes well-being; second, 
how does the government measure well-being; third, what augments well-
being; fourth, do people want to be happy; and finally, can and should the 
government promote subjective well-being?  This part surveys the 
happiness economics literature to address these five issues. 
A.  What Constitutes Well-Being? 
If competition policy’s ultimate aim is to increase total well-being, the 
first challenge is defining well-being.  Well-being, the literature recognizes, 
is multifaceted.  It includes “an overall evaluation of one’s life; . . . as 
experienced in day-to-day living; . . . as influenced by innate character traits 
such as positive and negative affect; and . . . as quality of life broadly 
defined.”52 
The happiness economics literature distinguishes Bentham’s hedonic 
happiness and Aristotle’s eudaimonia.53  For Bentham, happiness is derived 
from maximizing pleasure (which goes beyond the pleasures of sense and 
wealth) and minimizing pain.54  Bentham’s happiness is synonymous with 
pleasure, advantage, good, or benefit.55  For Aristotle, a happy life is 
achieved when “one is engaged in action and contemplation in accordance 
with virtue.”56  Well-being is derived from a meaningful and virtuous life, 
one with self-actualization, personal growth, and civic virtue.57  Well-being 
consists of life satisfaction or developing and fulfilling one’s potential.58 
 
 51. K. Van Miert, Speech on the Role of Competition Policy in Modern Economies 
Before the Danish Competition Council (Oct. 11, 1997), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/speeches/text/sp1997_061_en.html. 
 52. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 24; see also BOK, supra note 12, at 9–10; Alois Stutzer 
& Bruno S. Frey, Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective Well-Being, 
77 SOC. RES. 679, 680 (2010). 
 53. Antonella Delle Fave et al., The Eudaimonic and Hedonic Components of 
Happiness:  Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, 100 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 185 (2011); 
Huang, Happiness Studies, supra note 13, at 21.4–.5. 
 54. BENTHAM, supra note 26, at ch. 5, § 1. 
 55. Id. at ch. 1, § 3; FREY, supra note 12, at 5, 17–18 (discussing happiness as a positive 
and negative effect); GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 4. 
 56. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 39. 
 57. See Delle Fave et al., supra note 53, at 186. 
 58. FREY, supra note 12, at 5. 
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Rather than define well-being along one dimension (e.g., pleasure), the 
happiness literature generally recognizes well-being as multidimensional.  
For example, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission identified within the 
academic literature and various happiness measurement initiatives the 
following dimensions of well-being:  “(i) Material living standards (income, 
consumption and wealth); (ii) Health; (iii) Education; (iv) Personal 
activities including work; (v) Political voice and governance; (vi) Social 
connections and relationships; (vii) Environment (present and future 
conditions); [and] (viii) Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical 
nature.”59 
Likewise many people in one study defined happiness along multiple 
dimensions:  life domains associated with happiness (with family, 
interpersonal relations, and health being the most popular) and 
psychological components (harmony/balance, positive emotions, well-
being).60  With respect to the psychological components, those surveyed 
generally referred to both hedonic and eudaimonic aspects.61  On average, 
they also rated their life’s meaningfulness higher than their happiness, 
which they ranked higher than their satisfaction with their lives.62 
Consequently, if competition policy should increase total well-being, one 
issue is whether competition policy should promote primarily one 
dimension (e.g., hedonic) or multiple dimensions of well-being.  This can 
be important.  As discussed below, some factors (such as income) are 
correlated more strongly with some dimensions of well-being (such as life 
satisfaction) than other dimensions (experienced, everyday happiness).63  
Ultimately, “[h]appiness is an intrinsically pluralistic concept.”64 
B.  How To Measure Well-Being 
A second policy issue is which objective and subjective measures 
policymakers should employ to measure well-being, and to what extent do 
biases, heuristics, and imperfect willpower distort these measurements. 
 
 59. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 14–15, 151–53 (discussing Sen’s capabilities 
and functionings approach); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, FLOURISH:  A VISIONARY NEW 
UNDERSTANDING OF HAPPINESS AND WELL-BEING 11–12 (2011) (developing an integrated 
framework for happiness; one that involves positive emotion, engagement, relationships, 
meaning and purpose, and accomplishment.  Pleasure involves “positive emotion; what we 
feel:  pleasure, rapture, ecstasy, warmth, comfort, and the like”; engagement “is about flow:  
being one with the music, time stopping, and the loss of self-consciousness during an 
absorbing activity”; and meaning, which “consists in belonging to and serving something 
that you believe is bigger than the self”); Jon Hall et al., A Framework To Measure the 
Progress of Societies (OECD Working Paper No. 34, 2010), available at http://search.
oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=std/doc(2010)5&docLanguage=En. 
 60. Delle Fave et al., supra note 53, at 190, 193–94 (surveying 666 participants from 
Australia, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa). 
 61. Id. at 200 (hedonic aspects were cited in 23.8 percent of the answers). 
 62. Id. at 195, 197. 
 63. See infra Part III.C. 
 64. Pierluigi Barrotta, Why Economists Should Be Unhappy with the Economics of 
Happiness, 24 ECON. & PHIL. 145, 152 (2008). 
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1. Assessing the Extent to Which Biases, Heuristics, and Imperfect 
Willpower Distort the Measurement of Well-Being 
Economists historically assessed people’s utility indirectly by their actual 
choices (e.g., choosing to watch a televised football game), rather than 
directly by their subjective beliefs or intentions (e.g., believing I should 
study rather than watch TV).65  But people’s choices do not always reveal 
their actual preferences.66  Heuristics and biases affect decision making, 
such as the way the choice is framed.67  Consumers often simply accept the 
default option.68  Some lack willpower when making intertemporal choices 
(e.g., choosing to watch football rather than study for a test next week).69  
People can predict poorly as to what makes them happy and fail to 
appreciate the extent to which they adapt to new purchases or wealth.70  
Manipulation of consumer choices by business compounds this issue.71  
Thus, policymakers cannot reliably infer utility from consumers’ decisions. 
 
 65. See CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 43; John Beshears et al., How Are 
Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787, 1787 (2008) (“Revealed preference theory 
constructs utility functions that rationalize empirical observations of consumer choices and 
consumer budget constraints . . . .  Economists usually assume that these revealed 
preferences are also normative preferences—preferences that represent the economic actor’s 
true interests.  Economic welfare analysis and policy analysis almost always assume that 
revealed preferences and normative preferences are identical.”); Daniel Kahneman & Robert 
Sugden, Experienced Utility As a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE 
ECON. 161, 162 (2005). 
 66. See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 65, at 1788 (identifying five factors that 
increase the likelihood that revealed preferences will not have normative merit:  “passive 
choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-party marketing, and intertemporal 
choice”); Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  Utility Maximization and 
Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 223 (2006). 
 67. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 364–74 (2011). 
 68. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 7–8, 11–13 (2008). 
 69. See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 65, at 1789–90 (discussing intertemporal 
choice). 
 70. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from 
Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 402, 409–22 (2002); Faruk Gul & Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer, Welfare Without Happiness, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 471, 471 (2007); Daniel 
Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 
20 J. ECON. PERSP. 8–9 (2006); Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 65, at 161–81. 
 71. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., What’s Advertising Content Worth? Evidence 
from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field Experiment, 125 Q.J. ECON. 263 (2010); OFFICE OF 
FAIR TRADING, THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMES ON CONSUMER DECISION MAKING 5–20 (2010), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/OFT1226.pdf; OFFICE OF 
FAIR TRADING, WHAT DOES BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS MEAN FOR COMPETITION POLICY? 
(2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf; 
STEFFEN HUCK, JIDONG ZHOU & CHARLOTTE DUKE, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, CONSUMER 
BEHAVIOURAL BIASES IN COMPETITION:  A SURVEY (2011), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/research/OFT1324.pdf; Maurizio Pugno, The Easterlin 
Paradox and the Decline of Social Capital:  An Integrated Explanation, 38 J. SOCIO-ECON. 
590, 592 (2009) (discussing the power of advertising, especially for children and 
adolescents, to induce consumption); John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Quality of 
Life, 145 SCIENCE 117, 122 n.9 (1964) (“It is held that the provision of an expanding volume 
of consumer goods, among which the consumer exercises a sovereign choice, involves no 
value judgments. This might be approximately true if everything the consumer needs were 
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Rather than measure utility indirectly, the happiness literature generally 
seeks to measure it directly.  But if biases, heuristics, and imperfect 
willpower reduce the reliability of measuring utility through consumers’ 
choices, one issue is whether they also reduce the reliability of individuals’ 
self-appraisals of their well-being. 
Framing effects and biases can affect self-assessments of well-being. 
Individual responses can depend on the order or wording of questions, the 
scales applied, a fortunate event (like the individual discovering a dime 
before the questioning), or the current weather.72  One study, for example, 
examined the correlation between the responses to two questions:  “How 
happy are you?” and “How many dates did you have last month?”73  When 
the happiness question was asked first, no correlation was found between 
the responses.74  But when the dating question was asked first, the two 
questions’ responses were significantly correlated.75  In another study, 
individuals were asked first to recall either three positive or three negative 
recent life events.  Those asked to recall positive events reported higher 
current life satisfaction than those asked to recall recent negative events.76 
Another bias is duration neglect.  Individuals assess their instant hedonic 
happiness (pleasure or distress at that moment) at times differently from 
their remembered utility (retrospective evaluation of a temporary extended 
outcome).77  Kahneman and his colleagues tested this with a colonoscopy 
experiment.78  Half of the participants had the uncomfortable procedure 
extended by leaving the colonscope in place for about one minute after the 
clinical examination finished.  The other half had the colonscope removed 
immediately after the painful examination.  The patients who had the 
prolonged colonoscopy evaluated the procedure as better even though they 
were uncomfortable over a longer period.79  Kahneman described this as 
 
available from the market and if no attempt were made to manage his choice.  Conservatives 
instinctively but wisely insist that almost all important needs can be provided by the market, 
and that management of the consumer is of negligible importance.  This enables them to rest 
their case on an impersonal manifestation of individual choice.  It is also evident that the 
preconditions for their case are far from being met.”); Maurizio Pugno, The Easterlin 
Paradox and the Decline of Social Capital:  An Integrated Explanation, 38 J. SOCIO-ECON. 
590, 592 (2009) (discussing the power of advertising, especially for children and 
adolescents, to induce consumption). 
 72. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 406; Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at 6–7. 
 73. Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being:  Judgmental 
Processes and Their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING:  THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 12, at 63. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 65; see also Angus S. Deaton, The Financial Crisis and the Well-Being of 
Americans 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17128, 2011), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17128 (asking political questions first caused a large 
negative effect on reported well-being). 
 77. Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 
Q.J. ECON. 375, 379–92 (1997). 
 78. Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING:  THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 12, at 20. 
 79. Id. 
 2590 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
“Peak-End evaluation,” whereby people remember the utility or disutility of 
pleasant and unpleasant episodes by averaging the Peak (most intense value 
of pleasure or pain) and the pleasure or pain recorded near the experiment’s 
end.80  People neglect the experience’s duration.  “Peak-End evaluation” 
and duration neglect, also found in other experiments, draw into question 
self-assessments of well-being; people chose the longer unpleasant option, 
which seemingly did not maximize their utility as they were in pain 
longer.81 
Although biases and framing can affect self-assessments of well-being, 
this does not mean that subjective well-being measures are meaningless.  
First, consumers sometimes know what makes them happier (such as 
exercising), but lack the willpower.  So consumers’ self-assessments can 
sometimes more reliably measure utility than their choices (e.g., their 
inactivity). 
Second, to the extent framing or duration neglect bias self-assessments of 
well-being, conditions can be imposed to mitigate bias (e.g., by not 
prefacing questions of well-being with questions on dating).82 
Third, even when biases and framing cause people to incorrectly predict 
what will promote their well-being (e.g., trading off a longer commute for a 
bigger house in the suburbs), they often can assess their current state of 
experienced well-being (e.g., being miserable during the morning 
commute).  Many people arguably can assess whether they are currently 
happy (at least in terms of their hedonic happiness) and the degree of their 
pleasure or pain.  The findings from the happiness literature are consistent 
both internally and with other indicators of well-being.83  “Subjective 
measures of well-being have been tested against a wide range of indirect 
measures of well-being,” the OECD found, “and generally show the 
expected relationships.”84  Answers to life-satisfaction questions are “well-
correlated with at least five relevant sets of variables:  the reports of friends; 
the plausible causes of well-being; some plausible effects of well-being; 
physical functioning, such as levels of cortisol; and measures of brain 
activity.”85  People give similar answers to questions repeated later.86  
 
 80. Kahneman et al., supra note 77, at 381. 
 81. Kahneman, supra note 78, at 19–20. 
 82. Deaton, supra note 76, at 21 (using a transition question between the political 
question and well-being question to mitigate the political question’s negative effect). 
 83. Alan B. Krueger & David A. Schkade, The Reliability of Subjective Well-Being 
Measures 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13027, 2007), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13027 (finding a correlation between 0.5 and 0.7 in overall 
life satisfaction measures and affective experience measures in retesting individuals over a 
two-week period). 
 84. OECD, supra note 17, at 267. 
 85. Richard Layard, Measuring Subjective Well-Being, 327 SCIENCE 534, 534 (2010); 
see also OECD, supra note 17, at 267 (“Biological measurements, including the left/right 
brain activity, and levels of the stress hormone cortisol show a consistent relationship with 
self-ratings of well-being.”); Huang, Happiness Studies, supra note 13, at 21.7; Andrew J. 
Oswald & Stephen Wu, Objective Confirmation of Subjective Measures of Human Well-
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People who respond as being satisfied with their lives are also considered 
satisfied by family, friends, and experts.87 
Consequently, in addition to measuring utility indirectly through 
consumers’ choices, policymakers can assess well-being directly.  But with 
either measure, however, policymakers should consider the extent to which 
biases, heuristics, and imperfect willpower affect the measurements. 
2.  Different Approaches To Measure Well-Being 
When the government measures well-being directly through self-
assessments, another issue is what questions they should ask their citizens. 
The happiness economics literature contains questions about the pleasure or 
pain that respondents feel currently or recently from specific activities, their 
life satisfaction, the ladder of life,88 and their life’s purpose.89  Since well-
being, as Part II.A discussed, is multidimensional, well-being, is not 
surprisingly, measured differently and assesses these diverse considerations 
through: 
 a global evaluative approach, which “asks individuals to step back 
and reflect on their life and make a cognitive assessment of how their 
life is going overall, or on certain aspects of their life,”90 
 an eudemonic approach, which “draws on self-determination theory 
and tends to measure such things as people’s sense of meaning and 
purpose in life, connections with family and friends, a sense of 
control and whether they feel part of something bigger than 
themselves,”91 
 
Being:  Evidence from the U.S.A., 327 SCIENCE 576, 577 (2010); Stutzer & Frey, supra note 
52, at 684–85. 
 86. OECD, supra note 17, at 266. 
 87. Stutzer & Frey, supra note 52, at 684–85. 
 88. Gallup, for example, uses the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale: 
Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to 10 at the 
top. 
The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the 
ladder represents the worst possible life for you. 
On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this 
time? (ladder-present) 
On which step do you think you will stand about five years from now? (ladder-
future) 
Understanding How Gallup Uses the Cantril Scale Development of the “Thriving, 
Struggling, Suffering” Categories, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/122453/
understanding-gallup-uses-cantril-scale.aspx (emphasis omitted) (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 89. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 37. 
 90. U.K. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, INITIAL INVESTIGATION INTO SUBJECTIVE WELL-
BEING FROM THE OPINIONS SURVEY 4 (2011) [hereinafter INITIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT], 
available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/wellbeing/measuring-subjective-wellbeing-in-
the-uk/investigation-of-subjective-well-being-data-from-the-ons-opinions-survey/initial-
investigation-into-subjective-well-being-from-the-opinions-survey.html; see also CMEPSP 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 146–47; FREY, supra note 12, at 18–19. 
 91. See INITIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 90, at 4. 
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 an experience sampling approach, which randomly asks people 
throughout the day what they are doing and their positive and 
negative feelings,92 
 a day reconstruction approach, where participants complete a diary 
summarizing episodes from the prior day (when the episode began 
and ended, where they were, with whom they were interacting) and 
report the intensity of their feelings along nine categories on a scale 
from zero to six,93 and 
 objective measures of people’s material living conditions, their 
quality of life, and sustainability.94 
One issue is which measure(s) of well-being should policymakers use.95  
As two economists observed, most of this empirical happiness work has 
been based on “representative, large-scale sampling of individual global 
evaluations of life satisfaction.”96  The life-satisfaction measure, they state, 
is an “attractive proxy measure” in “blending cognitive judgment and 
affective state.”97  But the questions used to measure well-being can capture 
different dimensions. 
For example, the relationship between one’s income and well-being can 
differ depending on whether the person is asked about experienced, day-to-
day well-being or his or her life satisfaction.98  Greater wealth (relative to 
others) can enhance evaluations of life satisfaction, but not everyday 
experienced happiness.99  As Kahneman aptly observed, “Life satisfaction 
is not a flawed measure of their experienced well-being, as [he] thought 
some years ago.  It is something else entirely.”100 
Another issue is that, with some measures, the magnitude of difference in 
well-being can be quite small.101  Many people worldwide “claim to be 
 
 92. See id.; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 147 n.2; FREY, supra note 12, 
at 20; Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 65, at 175. 
 93. Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at 9–14; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra 
note 16, at 147 n.3. 
 94. OECD, supra note 17, at 18; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 15, 156 
(“In most cases, these themes include not just the measures of people’s subjective states 
described above, but also measures of their health and education, their daily activities, their 
participation in political processes, and the social and natural environment in which people 
are embedded and which shape their sense of security.”). 
 95. See Stutzer & Frey, supra note 52, at 683–84. 
 96. Id. at 684. 
 97. Id. 
 98. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 396. 
 99. Id. at 396–97; Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves 
Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional Well-Being, 107 PNAS EARLY EDITION 16,489, 16,491 
(2010) (finding from a U.S. survey of subjective well-being that beyond approximately 
$75,000, higher income “is neither the road to experienced happiness nor the road to the 
relief of unhappiness or stress, although higher income continues to improve individuals’ life 
evaluations”); see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 148. 
 100. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 397. 
 101. Timothy A. Judge & John D. Kammeyer-Mueller, Happiness As a Societal Value, 
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2011, at 33–34 (noting that 80 percent of national life satisfaction 
averages were within one point on a ten point scale, and for developed nations with a per 
capita GDP of $20,000 or more, 80 percent of the nations were within half of a point). But 
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‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied with their lives.”102  Also, in averaging a nation’s 
well-being, one may not necessarily capture well-being that comes at the 
expense of others (whether in that country or abroad).103 
Accordingly, because well-being is multidimensional, the OECD, 
Eurostat, and others advocate that multiple subjective and objective 
measures—sensitive to inequalities and distributional issues—be used to 
measure well-being.104 
C.  Determining the Causes of Well-Being 
Besides defining and measuring well-being, a third issue, which 
preoccupied philosophers and theologians for centuries and is now the 
focus of psychologists and economists, is whether well-being can be 
increased105 and, if so, what promotes well-being.106 
A 2006 survey of the empirical literature found several factors to be 
strongly correlated with subjective well-being,107 including personal 
characteristics, like age;108 socially developed characteristics, such as 
health109 and employment status;110 how the people spend their time,111 
 
see OECD, supra note 17, at 269 (finding a three point gap on an eleven point scale for 
OECD and large emerging countries, with countries falling within three groupings (below 
5.5, below 7, and above 7)). 
 102. BOK, supra note 12, at 24–25. 
 103. OECD, supra note 17, at 273–74 (noting the substantial variation in subjective well-
being within many countries, including the United States). 
 104.  BOK, supra note 12, at 18–19; CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 16; EUROSTAT, 
supra note 19, § 2.3. 
 105. The consensus is that genetic makeup influences well-being; but the extent to which 
genetics makeup does so is unresolved. Jan-Emmanuel De Neve et al., Genes, Economics, 
and Happiness, 5 J. NEUROSCIENCE PSYCHOL. ECON. 193, 194 (2011) (finding that 
“individuals with transcriptionally more efficient version of the serotonin transporter gene 
. . . are significantly more likely to report higher levels of life satisfaction,” and estimating 
the “heritability of subjective well-being at 33%, indicating that about one-third of the 
variance in individual life satisfaction can be attributed to genetic influences”); David 
Lykken & Auke Tellegen, Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 186, 186 
(1996) (estimating 44 percent to 52 percent of the variance in well-being is associated with 
genetic variation, and in retesting a smaller sample of twins after intervals of 4.5 and 10 
years, estimating the “heritability [as a] stable component of subjective well-being 
approaches 80%”). 
 106. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 25, at 197–98 (questioning whether true and perfect 
happiness is attainable on earth). 
 107. Paul Dolan et al., Do We Really Know What Makes Us Happy?  A Review of the 
Economic Literature on the Factors Associated with Subjective Well-Being, 29 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 94 (2008). 
 108. Id. at 98 (referencing studies consistently finding “a negative relationship between 
age and SWB and a positive relationship between age squared and SWB” and suggesting “a 
U-shaped curve with higher levels of well-being at the younger and older age points and the 
lowest life satisfaction occurring in middle age, between about 32 and 50 years, depending 
on the study”). 
 109. Id. at 100 (studies “consistently show a strong relationship between SWB and both 
physical and psychological health”); BOK, supra note 12, at 21 (noting how a drop of 20 
percent in self-evaluations of health is associated with an average decline in happiness of six 
points on a scale of one hundred). 
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such as religious activities;112 attitudes and beliefs towards self, others, and 
life;113 relationship status, such as living alone, living with a partner or 
being married,114 and seeing family and friends;115 and the country’s wider 
economic, social, and political environment, such as the degree of 
democracy.116 
Religious worship, for example, is strongly correlated with well-being.117  
Controlling for various factors associated with well-being, one study of 
Swiss residents found that going to church was not only positively 
correlated with well-being, but well-being “increases (almost) 
monotonically with a higher frequency of religious service attendance.”118 
Another study found that the repeal of the state blue laws (thereby enabling 
 
 110. BOK, supra note 12, at 20–21; CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 149–50; Deaton, 
supra note 76, at 40; Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 101 (“Studies consistently show a large 
negative effect of individual unemployment on SWB.  Models which treat life satisfaction 
scales as a continuous variable, tend to find that the unemployed have around 5–15% lower 
scores than the employed.”); Lasse Steiner et al., Economics, Religion and Happiness, 190 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSETHIK 1, 20 (2010). 
 111. BOK, supra note 12, at 20 (discussing research on how attending monthly club 
meetings or volunteering once a month is associated with a change in well-being equivalent 
to a doubling of income). 
 112. Id. at 21–22 (discussing the correlation of religion and volunteering with happiness); 
Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 104 (“[E]vidence is fairly consistent and suggests that regular 
engagement in religious activities is positively related to SWB.”).  
 113. CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART:  THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA 1960–2010, at 
262 (2012); Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 105 (“[E]vidence is relatively clear from the few 
studies that have looked at trust and the effects are relatively large,” such as several studies 
finding “social trust (trust in most other people) is associated with higher life satisfaction and 
happiness, and a lower probability of suicide.”). 
 114. BOK, supra note 12, at 17–18; (“On average, higher proportions of UK adults who 
were married, in a civil partnership or cohabitating reported high ratings of 9 or 10 out of 10 
for the ‘life satisfaction,’ ‘worthwhile’ and ‘happy yesterday’ questions than people who 
were single, widowed or divorced.”); MURRAY, supra note 113, at 256–57 (2012); Dolan et 
al., supra note 107, at 106 (“Although there is some variation across studies, [it] seems that 
being married is associated with the highest level of SWB and being separated is associated 
with the lowest level of SWB, lower even than being divorced or widowed.”); see also 
OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, FIRST ANNUAL ONS EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
RESULTS (2012) [hereinafter UK REPORT], available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
dcp171766_272294.pdf.  
 115. Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 107 (observing from studies that “overall, socialising 
with family and friends is positively associated with SWB”). 
 116. Id. at 109–10 (observing that most studies find a positive link between democracy 
and life satisfaction). 
 117. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 70 (finding that “respondents who expressed faith or 
religious affiliation—as well as those who practiced their faith—were happier than others”); 
MURRAY, supra note 113, at 259–60; Steiner et al., supra note 110, at 9 (“Almost all studies 
find a positive and significant relation between religion and happiness.”); Bernard M.S. van 
Praag et al., Happiness and Financial Satisfaction in Israel:  Effects of Religiosity, Ethnicity, 
and War, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1008, 1009 (2010) (noting that many studies have found a 
correlation between religiosity and increased happiness). 
 118. Steiner et al., supra note 110, at 20; see also Danny Cohen-Zada & William Sander, 
Religious Participation Versus Shopping:  What Makes People Happier?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 
889, 892 (2011). 
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working and shopping on Sunday) caused women’s religious participation 
and well-being to significantly decline.119 
Findings are mixed with respect to other factors associated with well-
being, such as income.120  Also, significant issues remain when assessing 
what factors actually promote or detract well-being, rather than being 
correlated with self-reported measures of well-being.121  Does community 
activity, for example, promote happiness or are happier people likelier to 
engage in community activity?  Some studies use natural experiments to 
tackle the direction of causation.122  Nevertheless, the causation issue has 
not been resolved, thus limiting the government’s ability to recommend 
specific legal policies. 
D.  Do People Want To Be Happy? 
Even if social scientists determined the causes of well-being, 
policymakers must assess whether people actually desire sustained well-
being.  If a formula for well-being exists, “what joy will [an individual] get 
out of functioning according to a timetable?”123 
Some evidence supports happiness as an important goal.124  A survey of 
college students, for example, found that only 6 percent of respondents 
rated money as more important than happiness:  “fully 69% rated happiness 
at the top of the importance scale, and only 1% claimed to have never 
thought about it” and “62% rated life satisfaction at the top of the 
importance scale, and only 2% reported never having thought about it.”125 
But it remains an empirical question whether most people in their 
thoughts, words, and deeds actually seek to maximize well-being.126  As 
two economists argue, one problem with well-being generally is its failure 
to incorporate other dimensions of experience that people care about, such 
as experiencing a range of feelings (including sadness), meaning (i.e., 
people care about the meaning from their activities), capabilities (the range 
 
 119. Cohen-Zada & Sander, supra note 118, at 891–92 (finding from the General Social 
Survey that respondents with higher attendance of religious services report greater 
happiness, and those who attend services more than once a week are about twice as likely to 
report being very happy than those who never attend services). 
 120. Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 112; see also Nattavudh Powdthavee, How Much 
Does Money Really Matter?  Estimating the Causal Effects of Income on Happiness, 
39 EMPIRICAL ECON. 77, 78–79 (2010) (discussing the biases, such as adaptation, associated 
with estimating the effect of income on life satisfaction, and the infrequency of large scale 
natural or randomized experiments where money is randomly allocated to treatment and 
control groups). 
 121. FREY, supra note 12, at 11; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 150; Judge 
& Kammeyer-Mueller, supra note 101, at 35. 
 122. Cohen-Zada & Sander, supra note 118, at 891. 
 123. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND 104 (Signet Classics 2004) 
(1864). 
 124. Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, supra note 101, at 32. 
 125. Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being:  The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a 
National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 34, 34 (2000) (surveying 7,204 respondents in forty-two 
countries). 
 126. FREY, supra note 12, at 6–7, 164. 
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of opportunities available in their lives), and altruistic and moral 
considerations (empathy for the poor).127  Humans are capable of far more 
than maximizing their utility and “may be judged in a moral framework that 
values something greater than the autonomy needed to satisfy individual 
preferences.”128  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes this 
concern: 
Even as happiness might fail to suffice for well-being, well-being itself 
may be only one component of a good life, and not the most important 
one at that.  Here “good life” means a life that is good all things 
considered, taking account of all the values that matter in life, whether 
they benefit the individual or not.  Kant, for example, considered both 
morality and well-being to be important but distinct elements of a good 
life.  Yet morality should be our first priority, never to be sacrificed for 
personal happiness.129 
E.  Can and Should the Government Promote Total Well-Being? 
Even if citizens desire greater or sustained well-being along some agreed-
upon dimensions, several concerns arise as to whether the state can and 
should directly promote its citizens’ well-being.130 
One concern about the government promoting well-being is its 
mechanistic view of human beings, where the state can account for (or 
reduce) the presumably minor individual differences among its citizens.131  
Logically, the state can never fully maximize well-being, unless the state 
can perfect each individual’s well-being, which the state cannot do when 
individual tastes differ, conflict, or depend on a relative advantage (such as 
happiness derived from status goods).  In promoting one dimension of well-
being (e.g., a drug-induced hedonic happiness), the state will not 
necessarily maximize well-being if other citizens place greater value on 
other dimensions, such as life satisfaction. 
Second, the belief that the state must promote its citizens’ well-being 
implies that the state, not the individual, is responsible for maximizing well-
 
 127. George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision 
and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795, 1802 (2008); see also FREY, 
supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 128. Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness:  A Catholic Critique of 
Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35, 51 (2005); see also CMEPSP REPORT, 
supra note 16, at 156 (noting how Sen’s capability approach “treats subjective well-being as 
just one aspect of [quality of life] among the many capabilities that people have reasons to 
value”); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 273 (2009) (“The central issue is not the 
significance of happiness, but the alleged insignificance of everything else, on which many 
advocates of the happiness perspective seem to insist.”). 
 129. Dan Haybron, Happiness, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/
happiness/. 
 130. BOK, supra note 12, at 46–54. 
 131. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD AND BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 326 
(Harper Collins 2004) (1932). 
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being.132  On the one hand, citizens cannot increase their well-being absent 
some collective action.  Incremental well-being comes from public goods 
(public and environmental safety) that citizens individually cannot obtain, 
as well as from other legal institutions.133  On the other hand, concerns 
about governmental paternalism arise.  At times, people cannot accurately 
predict what promotes their well-being.134  As Eurostat stated, 
Whilst [citizens’] stated preferences are important, one should be careful 
not to confuse them too much with well-being itself.  What people say 
will improve or harm their well-being may not necessarily actually 
improve or harm their well-being.135 
While true, the statement nonetheless raises concerns about the loss of 
individual accountability and liberty. 
A third concern of the state seeking to augment total well-being is that 
individual autonomy is devalued.136  If humans were simply a product of 
their social condition and “their individual differences were trifling,” 
observed Aldous Huxley, “there would be no need for liberty and the state 
would be justified in persecuting the heretics who demanded it.”137 
Likewise, the Federalist Papers recognize that, “in every political 
institution, a power to advance the public well-being involves a discretion 
which may be misapplied and abused.”138  Further, 
in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, 
whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, 
in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible 
against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.139   
With the goal of maximizing well-being, the state could justify 
prohibiting (or promoting) activities that it determines reduce (or increase) 
well-being.  If the state determines that physical exercise and attending 
religious services increase well-being, could the state compel or cajole 
citizens to bicycle to mass?  Or could the government promote a particular 
religion to promote religious harmony and well-being?140  One hardly 
 
 132. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 151 (“The concept of freedom emphasises the 
importance of empowering people to help themselves, and of focusing on individuals as the 
actors of their own development.”). 
 133. See infra Part III.D. 
 134. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 135. EUROSTAT, supra note 19, § 2.7 (recommending that government agencies 
synthesize citizens’ stated preferences with empirical evidence on well-being determinants). 
 136. See Barrotta, supra note 64, at 161. 
 137. HUXLEY, supra note 131, at 326. 
 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
 139. Id. 
 140. The Royal Government of Bhutan, for example, decided in 2005 to develop Gross 
National Happiness indicators “to check whether programmes and policies are consistent 
with the values of GNH.” 2010 Survey Results:  Results of the Second Nationwide 2010 
Survey on Gross National Happiness, GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS, http://www.grossnational
happiness.com/survey-results/index/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  Its efforts have been 
widely praised and its human rights record, according to human rights activists and 
government reports, is relatively better than some other area countries.  But, as the U.S. 
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expects atheists or other congregants to be happier as a result.  As two 
pioneers in the happiness research discuss, the literature mostly assumes a 
benevolent dictator, where the government, individual politicians, and 
public officials are “able and willing to pursue people’s happiness or to 
maximize a social welfare function where individuals’ welfare is proxied by 
individuals’ reported subjective well-being.”141  Well-being, as some argue, 
presupposes autonomy, which increases the chances that well-being can 
arise from the standard of life freely chosen.142 
A fourth concern about the government promoting well-being is the rule 
of law.  Because well-being is multifaceted, the government policies 
invariably will conflict, thereby giving the state too much discretion in 
choosing the means to promote well-being.  For example, hateful, offensive 
speech can reduce a listener’s well-being.  But “[i]t is firmly settled that 
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited 
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers.”143  Governments currently take different approaches to outlawing 
hate speech.144  If promoting well-being were the objective, however, the 
State could demand greater latitude in prosecuting speech it finds 
detrimental to others’ well-being. This affords the state flexibility and 
discretion in punishing some speakers, while protecting others.  But in 
doing so, the state devalues other quality-of-life factors correlated with 
well-being (such as the rule of law, individual liberty, and freedom).145  
Accordingly, in promoting well-being, government policies can become 
more subjective and less accountable, predictable, and transparent, as the 
State chooses how to promote well-being.  To the extent that the rule of law 
and liberty promote well-being, the state’s ability to augment total well-
being is inherently limited. 
A fifth concern about the state promoting total well-being involves the 
concerns over utilitarianism generally.146  As one judge remarked, 
 
Department of State reports, Mahayana Buddhism is the state religion, and the Bhutan 
government “discouraged both large and small religious gatherings of non-Buddhists, did not 
allow construction of non-Buddhist places of worship, and did not allow non-Buddhist 
missionaries to work in the country.”  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 
Bhutan:  International Religious Freedom Report 2007, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.
gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2007/90227.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  Moreover, “in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, many ethnic Nepalese residents, a majority of whom were Hindu, were 
forcibly expelled or voluntarily left as a result of discrimination.” Id. 
 141. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, The Use of Happiness Research for Public Policy, 
38 SOC. CHOICE WELFARE 659, 660 (2011). 
 142. See Barrotta, supra note 64, at 156–59, 161. 
 143. Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
 144. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012) (noting 
differences among hate speech statutes adopted in Canada, Denmark, Germany, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom). 
 145. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 177–80. 
 146. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 128, at 277–90; BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF 
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 777–80 (1972). 
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The due process clause was not meant to codify some arid theory of 
utilitarianism. Rather, the requirement of accuracy and minimum 
procedural safeguards follows from the fundamental assumption that 
government officials will tend to abuse unfettered discretion to oppress 
individuals; procedural safeguards place a check on such discretion and 
help preserve the substantive liberties and inherent dignity of the 
individual.147 
One issue is whether the state can trade off some citizens’ well-being to 
promote the well-being of others.  What promotes some people’s well-
being, observed the OECD, “may be ethically objectionable or affected by 
personal circumstances to which individuals adapt, even if that is not 
objectively good.”148  Another issue is whether utility should be maximized 
(or sacrificed) today at the expense (or for the benefit) of future generations. 
Sixth, even if one accepts that the state should promote total well-being, 
can it?  Well-being can depend on relative versus absolute consumption. 
Absolute consumption depends on the “absolute desirability of the good” 
itself, such as the happiness derived from eating an ice cream cone.149  
Relative consumption depends on “wealth, acquisition, and consumption 
levels relative to others,” such as the purchase of jewelry and 
automobiles.150  To the extent that the government policy benefits everyone 
and that utility is relative rather than absolute, the government policy fails 
to improve total well-being.  Promoting overall well-being can lead to an 
incongruous result:  the government program is circumscribed to selectively 
benefit some, even if the program could benefit all.151 
Another issue for policymakers is adaptation.  People, for example, 
generally adapt to higher incomes.  So, depending on the government policy 
(such as a tax break), the ensuing happiness can be short lived, as people 
adapt to the higher living standard.  Adaptation also applies to noneconomic 
measures.  Married people, for example, are relatively happier than single, 
divorced, or widowed people.152  But one study shows that the life 
satisfaction of German married couples declined from its peak shortly after 
marriage.153 
 
 147. Frier v. City of Vandalia, 770 F.2d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., concurring 
in the result); see also United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(noting one major problem with utilitarianism is that “the individual criminal can be treated 
very cruelly, to gain some societal advantage even through [sic] the crime is minor—or very 
leniently, despite the shocking nature of the crime—if that will on balance benefit society”), 
aff’d, 166 F.3d 1202 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 148. OECD, supra note 17, at 266 (citations omitted). 
 149. BERND SCHMITT, EXPERIENCE MARKETING:  CONCEPTS, FRAMEWORKS AND 
CONSUMER INSIGHTS 44 (2011). 
 150. Id. at 96; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Penguin Books 
1994) (1899). 
 151. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 152 (“Policies supportive of human 
development should expand the opportunities available to people, which would be valuable 
irrespectively of the effect on people’s subjective states.”). 
 152. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 153. FREY, supra note 12, at 89. 
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Even for absolute consumption, looking around the world today, one sees 
governments increasing human misery rather than well-being.  If 
governments can promote well-being, why then haven’t citizens, after 
revolting against their oppressors, modeled their governments after 
Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, whose citizens, on 
average, had the highest life satisfaction?154 
States that are more intrusive in their citizens’ lives, including communist 
countries, do not necessarily have happier citizens.  The OECD asked 
people around the world to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 their general 
satisfaction with their life.155  The average across the surveyed countries 
was 6.7.156  Russians, on average, were less satisfied (5.3), with little 
difference between Russian men (5.3) and women (5.2).157  One 
explanation perhaps is that Russians assess their life differently than the 
Swedes.  But “[i]n Russia 59% of people reported having more positive 
experiences in an average day (feelings of rest, pride in accomplishment, 
enjoyment, etc.) than negative ones (pain, worry, sadness, boredom, etc.),” 
which again was lower than the OECD average of 72 percent.158  Nor is 
there evidence that the Chinese, despite their country’s economic gains, are 
more satisfied with their lives.159  The People’s Republic of China, despite 
being wealthier (in terms of GDP) than some of the other countries 
surveyed, had the lowest reported average life satisfaction.160  Likewise, 
one 2006 survey of Cubans in Havana and Santiago found only 25 percent 
satisfied with their “freedom to choose what to do with [their] life,” (lower 
than the average of 80 percent in the rest of urban Latin America); 34 
percent could use their talent as much as they would like, 53 percent could 
choose how they spent their day yesterday, 56 percent said they were 
“proud of something” done the previous day (compared to 72 percent for 
other urban Latin Americans), 63 percent said they experienced enjoyment 
the previous day (compared to 79 percent for other urban Latin Americans) 
 
 154. Life Satisfaction, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/
topics/life-satisfaction/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  
 157. The bottom 20 percent of the surveyed Russian population had a life satisfaction 
level of 5, while the top 20 percent rated their life satisfaction as a 5.8. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Richard A. Easterlin et al., China’s Life Satisfaction, 1990–2010, PNAS (May 14, 
2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/05/09/1205672109.full.pdf (noting that 
China’s transition “has been marked by perhaps the highest two-decade rate of growth in 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ever seen, a remarkable ≥8% per year.  Between 
1990 and 2009, per capita GDP and consumption in China (in constant dollar terms) 
increased by at least fourfold.” (citation omitted)); Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at 
15–16. 
 160. OECD, supra note 17, at 269 (surveying forty countries’ residents using a Cantril 
Ladder metric for life satisfaction). 
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and 62 percent said they laughed or smiled (compared to 82 percent other 
urban Latin Americans).161 
It may be that the state can increase total well-being more effectively 
through indirect measures, such as fostering civic virtue and limiting 
government discretion (through the rule of law, protections of liberty, and 
anti-corruption measures), than through direct measures. 
Finally, if the state’s mandate were to increase total well-being, besides 
the concerns over utilitarianism generally, there is the concern that the state 
will manipulate the measurements.162  Citizens would complain if the well-
being metrics report declines in well-being.  So government officials have a 
greater incentive to manipulate the measures.  In a 2011 Global Happiness 
Index, for example, the People’s Republic of China came in first “with a 
perfect 100 rating.”163  North Korea came in second, trailing China by only 
two points, followed by Cuba (93 points), Iran (88 points), and Venezuela 
(85 points). 164  South Korea finished 152nd with 18 points, and the United 
States finished 203rd with only 2 points.  Who released the Index?  The 
state-owned North Korean Central Television.165 
F.  The Happiness Literature Does Not Provide an Analytical Framework 
for Addressing Specific Antitrust Issues 
Even if these five fundamental issues were resolved, the happiness 
literature does not provide an analytical framework for addressing specific 
antitrust issues, such as the legality of a merger or a monopolist’s conduct.  
Nor does the happiness literature provide sufficient guidance to reorient 
current antitrust legal standards toward the goal of promoting total well-
being.  Courts and agencies would still assess the alleged anticompetitive 
restraint’s likely competitive effects and deduce from the competitive 
effects whether total well-being would increase or decrease.  Determining 
various restraints’ competitive effects is often daunting for courts and 
agencies.  Adding well-being to the courts’ and agencies’ analysis 
complicates matters by adding another (and seemingly superfluous) step. 
If the agency or court sought to avoid the competitive effects analysis 
altogether and ask citizens how a merger or restraint would impact their 
well-being, this inquiry could be subject to the aforementioned behavioral 
biases.  One risk is that market participants, unable to assess how the 
restraint will affect them, would substitute an easier question (how do I feel 
 
 161. Cubans Show Little Satisfaction with Opportunities and Individual Freedom, 
WORLD PUB. OPINION (Jan. 10, 2007), http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brlatin
americara/300.php?lb=brla&pnt=300&nid=&id=. 
 162. FREY, supra note 12, at 166. 
 163. Find a Kingdom of Happiness:  Would You Be Happier Somewhere Else?, COLORS 
(Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.colorsmagazine.com/stories/magazine/83/story/find-a-kingdom-
of-happiness. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.; New Happiness Survey Finds North Korea # 2 According to N. Korean TV, 
GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS (June 6, 2011), http://new.gnhusa.org/surveys/new-happiness-
survey-finds-north-korea-2-according-to-n-korean-tv/. 
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about big business or mergers involving them) for the harder question (may 
this merger substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, 
and, if so, how will that affect my well-being).166 
Not surprisingly, one scholar did not believe that the happiness literature 
could significantly inform the regulation of natural monopolies:  “[T]he 
idea of experience sampling as a way to guide policy with respect to natural 
monopolies seems more like science fiction than anything else.”167 
Competition policy, as Part I discusses, should increase total well-being.  
But as this Part observes, important issues remain, such as what dimensions 
of well-being should competition policy promote, what measures of well-
being should be employed, what promotes well-being, and whether the 
government can and should promote total well-being.  As the OECD (which 
advocates incorporating subjective well-being into policymaking) 
recognizes, the current challenge is still collecting comparable and 
meaningful subjective and objective data across countries.168  Advances in 
the happiness economics literature will enable policymakers to measure 
well-being (or at least sources of misery, such as unemployment, mental 
illness, or inadequate health care).169  But the happiness literature currently 
does not provide competition policymakers a comprehensive analytical 
framework to reorient their legal standards toward promoting total well-
being. 
III.  HOW THE HAPPINESS ECONOMICS LITERATURE 
CAN INFORM COMPETITION POLICY 
Although, as Part II discussed, the happiness literature does not provide 
an analytical framework for analyzing routine antitrust issues, this does not 
mean that competition officials should discount or ignore the literature 
altogether.  The findings of the happiness economics literature, as this Part 
argues, offer some helpful insights on the current debate over antitrust’s 
goals.  The literature suggests that competition policy in a post-industrial 
wealthy country would be more efficacious (in terms of increased well-
being) in promoting economic, social, and democratic values, rather than 
simply promoting a narrowly defined consumer welfare objective. 
As Part III.A discusses, competition policy is not inherently limited to 
one economic goal, such as maximizing consumer surplus.  Competition 
policy has historically sought to promote political, social, and moral values 
of fair competition; dispersal of economic power; and individual autonomy.  
Despite these historical concerns about concentrated economic power, some 
U.S. courts and antitrust enforcers largely discounted or ignored these 
noneconomic values.  Americans, as Part III.B discusses, paid the price. But 
even if the antitrust legal standards were recalibrated to promote consumer 
 
 166. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 25, 97–105. 
 167. Harrison, supra note 13, at 2380. 
 168. OECD, supra note 17, at 279. 
 169. BOK, supra note 12, at 51. 
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welfare by lowering prices and increasing consumer surplus, Part III.C 
examines the benefits of a competition policy that seeks primarily to 
increase consumer surplus in a post-industrial, post-materialist wealthy 
society like the United States.  Promoting this goal to the exclusion of other 
traditional antitrust values would more likely decrease, rather than increase, 
total well-being. 
A.  The Deemphasis of Competition Policy’s Noneconomic Goals 
As this and earlier symposia reflect, competition policy is not inherently 
confined to a single economic objective, such as maximizing consumer 
welfare; total welfare; or allocative, productive, or dynamic efficiency.170  
Although some seek to confine competition policy to a single objective,171 
other competition officials, scholars, lawyers, and judges recognize 
competition policy’s multiple economic, political, social, and moral 
objectives.172  As Justice Brandeis observed: 
There is a widespread belief that . . . by the control which the few have 
exerted through giant corporations, individual initiative and effort are 
 
 170. See, e.g., Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2572–74 (2013) (discussing why democracy is good for antitrust); 
see also Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Goals of Antitrust:  A Dialogue on 
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium on Antitrust Law 
and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918 (1979). 
 171. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 29 (positing that the only goal of antitrust is to increase 
consumer welfare, which is in reality total welfare); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) (efficiency is not only an important goal, it is the only goal 
of antitrust law). 
 172. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230–31 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, J., concurring) (noting that the judge did not “believe that the debate 
over the purposes of antitrust laws [was] settled yet” and thought “it premature to construct 
an antitrust test that ignores all other potential concerns of the antitrust laws except for 
restriction of output and price raising”); Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enters., Inc., 200 
Cal. App. 3d 687, 709 n.11 (Ct. App. 1988) (observing that the “debate over the purposes of 
the antitrust laws has generally acknowledged a balance of economic, social, and political 
goals”); ICN REPORT, supra note 22; Stucke, Goals, supra note 8; William E. Kovacic, 
Module 1:  Origins and Aims of Competition Policy, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK 
(May 2011), http://www.icnblog.org/ftc/ftc-1-module-4-28-11/player.html (discussing the 
Sherman Act’s political and economic objectives); see also Robert Pitofsky, The Political 
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–52 (1979) (“It is bad history, bad policy, 
and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws,” and any 
antitrust policy that excluded such political values “would be unresponsive to the will of 
Congress.”); Jed Rakoff, Lecture:  Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of 
Economic Expertise, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4, 9 (2012) (observing how antitrust 
theorists are currently divided into “three warring camps”:  “One camp thinks the most 
important values that the antitrust laws are designed and should be interpreted to promote are 
social or political values having to do with decentralizing economic power and equalizing 
the distribution of wealth . . . .  [T]he two other camps . . . are united in believing that the 
only proper goals of antitrust law are economic . . . [but are divided between] a ‘Harvard 
School,’ [which is] prone to find monopolistic practices, and a ‘Chicago School,’ which 
believes the same practices to be for the most part procompetitive.”); Louis B. Schwartz, 
“Justice” and Other Non-economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076 (1979) 
(“[P]utative economic gains should not be the exclusive or decisive factors in resolving 
antitrust controversies.”). 
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being paralyzed, creative power impaired and human happiness lessened; 
that the true prosperity of our past came not from big business, but 
through the courage, the energy and the resourcefulness of small men; 
that only by releasing from corporate control the faculties of the unknown 
many, only by the opening to them of the opportunities for leadership, can 
confidence in our future be restored and the existing misery be overcome; 
and that only through participation by the many in the responsibilities and 
determinations of business, can Americans secure the moral and 
intellectual development which is essential to the maintenance of 
liberty.173 
Among antitrust’s traditional aims are that (1) private economic power, 
like all absolute power, is subject to abuse and injurious to public welfare 
and our democratic ideals; (2) such power must be decentralized to protect a 
free society from its abuse; (3) competitively structured markets diffuse 
private power and discipline economic decision making; and 
(4) competition policy is critical to preserving competitive markets.174  
Competition policy, like our constitutional framework, sought to distribute 
power, rather than to promote its consolidation or concentration.  
Antitrust’s “political values,” Professor Pitofsky noted, were “first, a fear 
that excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic 
political pressures, and second, a desire to enhance individual and business 
freedom by reducing the range within which private discretion by a few in 
the economic sphere controls the welfare of all.”175 
 
 173. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 174. See WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX:  INDUSTRY, 
LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 97–104 (2d ed. 2004); see also Atl. 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 n.19 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citing some of the case law and scholarship referencing antitrust’s noneconomic goals); 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Sherman Act is “the Magna 
Carta of free enterprise”); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 
(1933) (Sherman Act as a “charter of freedom”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting Congress’s desire to strengthen small business 
concerns and to “put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of 
the individual before them”); JOSEPH W. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS:  THEIR 
ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETATION AND EFFECT 341 (1958) (“Concern over excessive growth 
of private economic power and its social and political implications is built into every 
member of the structure of antitrust policy, including section 7.”); Harlan M. Blake & 
William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 
424 (1965); John Flynn & James Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of 
Vertical Restraints:  The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of 
Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1137–41 (1987) (discussing the political, social, 
and moral—as well as economic—goals motivating Congress in enacting antitrust 
legislation); Milton Handler, Is Antitrust’s Centennial a Time for Obsequies or for Renewed 
Faith in Its National Policy?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1933 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 175. Pitofsky, supra note 172, at 1051. 
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This concern over concentrated economic power arose at our nation’s 
founding,176 in the late 1800s when the Sherman Act was enacted,177 and 
before and during World War II.178  As Senator Kefauver said, 
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other 
nations where mergers and concentrations have placed economic control 
in the hands of a very few people is too clear to pass over easily.  A point 
is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in this 
country, where the public steps in to take over when concentration and 
monopoly gain too much power.  The taking over by the public through 
its government always follows one or two methods and has one or two 
political results.  It either results in a Fascist state or the nationalization of 
industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist state.179 
The Clayton Act is prophylactic in nature.  In 1950, Congress amended 
section 7 of the Clayton Act “to arrest the trend toward concentration, the 
tendency to monopoly, before the consumer’s alternatives disappeared 
through merger.”180  One purpose of section 7 and the Court’s presumption 
was Congress’s premise that mergers tend to accelerate concentration in an 
industry: 
The use of these words [“may be”] means that the bill, if enacted, would 
not apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable probability of 
the [proscribed] effect. . . .  The words ‘may be’ have been in section 7 of 
 
 176. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID 
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 196 (1965); see also The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 47 (1872). 
 177. As Senator Sherman said: 
If the concentered powers of this combination are intrusted to a single man, it is a 
kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be 
subject to the strong resistance of the State and national authorities. If anything is 
wrong this is wrong. If we will not endure a king as a political power we should 
not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the 
necessaries of life. 
21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 
50 (1911); id. at 83–84 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Daniel R. Ernst, The 
New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (1990); Hofstadter, supra note 
176, at 206–07; Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 96 (1982). 
 178. See WENDELL BERGE, CARTELS:  CHALLENGE TO A FREE WORLD (1944); Wilhelm 
Cohnstaedt, Germany’s Cartels and State Control:  A Revealing Study of the Reich’s Post-
War Industrial Monopoly Organizations, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1935, at BR9; John H. 
Crider, Roosevelt Calls for Cartels Curb:  In Letter to Hull He Says Types of “Trusts” Used 
by Reich Must Be Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1944, at 1. 
 179. 96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950). 
 180. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963) (emphasis omitted); see 
also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) (“[I]t is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a 
barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its 
provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of 
competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.”).  The DOJ, under its 1968 
Merger Guidelines, also applied “an additional, stricter standard in determining whether to 
challenge mergers occurring in any market, not wholly unconcentrated, in which there is a 
significant trend toward increased concentration.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., 
1968 GUIDELINES § 7 (1968), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.htm. 
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the Clayton Act since 1914.  The concept of reasonable probability 
conveyed by these words is a necessary element in any statute which 
seeks to arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency and before they 
develop into full-fledged restraints violative of the Sherman Act.  A 
requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition is 
incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching 
incipient restraints.181 
In response to Congressional concerns over the rising tide of economic 
concentration in the U.S. economy, the Court applied a presumption.  If 
post-merger, the firm controls “an undue percentage share of the relevant 
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in 
that market,” then the courts will presume that that merger “is so inherently 
likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the 
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have 
such anticompetitive effects.”182  In United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank, the Court did not attempt “to specify the smallest market share which 
would still be considered to threaten undue concentration” but was “clear 
that 30% presents that threat.”183  The Court, with its presumption, sought 
to bring greater transparency and predictability to merger review, while 
accommodating antitrust’s multiple concerns about concentrated economic 
power.184 
As Congress expressed and the Court operationalized in its presumption, 
society often pays a price in permitting political and economic power to be 
concentrated.185  Professor Williamson, in his famous trade-off calculus for 
weighing the effects of economic concentration on total welfare, included in 
his calculation the other social costs imposed or incurred by the monopolist 
or cartel, such as the political implications of control over wealth, which he 
observed are “a matter for serious concern.”186  With a powerful domestic 
producer, for example, the government may be swayed to erect protectionist 
measures.187  Although the political implications may be beyond 
quantification, the issue, Williamson recognized, is nevertheless important 
and cannot be ignored.188 
Over the past thirty years, however, some federal courts and scholars 
devalued Congress’s noneconomic concern over concentrated economic 
 
 181. S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 6 (1950). 
 182. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. 
 183. Id. at 364.  The Court, in subsequent cases, lowered the presumption somewhat to 
even 25 percent or less. United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964); United 
States v Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 278, 280 (1964). 
 184. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 365. 
 185. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:  THE 
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012). 
 186. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:  The Welfare Tradeoffs, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 24, 28–32 (1968). 
 187. See id. at 29; UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKBOOK, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
 188. See Williamson, supra note 186, at 29. 
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power.189  Justice Stevens, for example, criticized the Court, “in its haste to 
excuse illegal behavior in the name of efficiency,” of casting “aside a 
century of understanding that our antitrust laws are designed to safeguard 
more than efficiency and consumer welfare, and that private actions not 
only compensate the injured, but also deter wrongdoers.”190 
One reason why competition policy’s noneconomic goals declined in 
importance was the courts’ and scholars’ embrace of the Chicago school’s 
neoclassical economic theories, which offered “powerful simplifications,” 
such as “rationality, profit maximization, [and] the downward sloping 
demand curve.”191 With the Chicago school’s ascendency, the theory’s 
flaws permeated competition policy.192  With certain physical sciences, 
what is important is often measurable.  One criticism of neoclassical 
economic theory, however, is what is measurable becomes 
disproportionately important.193  So those factors that are easier to assess 
(such as the merger’s likely short-term impact on price, output, or 
productive efficiency in narrowly defined markets) increase in importance.  
Those factors that are harder to assess or measure (like the merger’s impact 
on innovation, systemic risk, and its risks to democracy and individual 
autonomy) are ignored or discounted.194  Policymakers, for example, 
generally recognize dynamic efficiency as more important to economic 
growth than productive efficiencies.195  But dynamic efficiency is harder to 
 
 189. Fayus Enters. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 602 F.3d 444, 453–54 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observing 
“a tension—and in federal antitrust law a radical change over time—between the goal of 
increasing consumer welfare in the economic efficiency sense and contrasting goals such as 
protecting small competitors or preventing the concentration of economic or political power 
without regard to economic efficiency” and that it “is far from clear that state antitrust law 
has, as a general matter, made the transition that has marked federal law”); Cieri v. Leticia 
Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29, 35 n.10 (Haw. 1995) (“[T]here is little if anything in the 
cases that suggests the courts have in fact been willing to pursue populist goals at the 
expense of competition and efficiency. . . .  If anything, they support the priority of 
competition and its efficiency goals.” (quoting 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 103 (1978))). 
 190. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting). 
 191. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
925, 931 (1979); see also Darren Bush, Too Big To Bail:  The Role of Antitrust in Distressed 
Industries, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 291–95 (2010). 
 192. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 44–45. 
 193. For a general criticism, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, Nobel 
Memorial Lecture Delivered in Stockholm (Dec. 11, 1974), in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 266 
(Chaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984). 
 194. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision 
Making:  Antitrust As A Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 583 (1986) (“Contemporary 
analysis routinely omits from the economic equation the soft data and the dynamic 
implications that would, if accounted for, favor the entrepreneur.  In particular, the model 
omits the freedoms, the opportunities, the prospects for change, and the spur from the sense 
of having a fair chance that comes from an environment hospitable to those without power.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Williamson, supra note 186, at 23 (noting that a defect common to all 
partial equilibrium constructions is its failure to examine interactions between sectors). 
 195. OECD, DYNAMIC EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER ANALYSIS 10 (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/40623561.pdf (“[I]nnovation is responsible for 
most of the increase in material standards of living that has taken place since the industrial 
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predict and quantify than productive efficiencies; thus, with some 
exceptions, courts and agencies largely ignored the impact of mergers on 
dynamic efficiency, focusing instead on a static price competition and 
productive efficiencies.196 
With the Chicago school’s rise in the late 1970s, some economists and 
lawyers found it fashionable to dismiss antitrust’s historic concerns about 
trends toward concentration and concentrated economic power.197  Before 
the economic crisis, the conventional wisdom was that antitrust agencies 
and courts could (and should) use concentration only as a screen:  the 
agencies would challenge only those few mergers that, under the prevailing 
neoclassical economic thinking, would demonstrably lead to higher post-
merger prices in narrowly defined markets.198  Although the Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ) at times argued the incipiency 
standard,199 it inexplicably alleged in its complaints how the merger will 
(rather than may) lessen price competition in narrowly defined markets.200  
 
revolution. It seems likely that dynamic efficiencies have a considerably greater potential to 
benefit consumers than static efficiencies have.”). 
 196. Id. at 9 (“Dynamic efficiencies pose an even greater measurement problem than 
static efficiencies because dynamic effects will occur—if at all—over several time periods 
and may be more abstract in nature than static effects.  Courts have shown a tendency to 
avoid delving into such exercises whenever possible.”); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY 
IGNORED:  HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN AND CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN 
INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 85–86 (2011) (noting the 
intellectual confinement of antitrust to static price competition when dynamic competition 
provides the greater benefits). 
 197. The President of AAI described this trend. Symposium, Panel Discussion I:  
Development of Bank Merger Law, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 511, 523 (2008) (Bert 
Foer:  “the modern era of merger policy began with the 1982 Merger Guidelines.  The 
current guidelines were issued jointly by the DOJ and the FTC in 1992 and revised a little bit 
in 1997.  They are limited to horizontal mergers—not vertical mergers, not conglomerate 
mergers. Reflecting the influence of the Chicago School, they focus on market power as the 
source of concern, and they don’t talk about trends of concentration, as Justice Brennan did, 
or protection of small business, which was one of the objectives of some of the earlier 
merger decisions.”). 
 198. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES 15 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
215247.pdf [hereinafter DOJ & FTC COMMENTARY ON GUIDELINES]. See generally First & 
Waller, supra note 170, at 2551 (discussing the dramatic evolution of section 7); Lawrence 
Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:  Stacking the Deck Against 
Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159. 
 199. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law, United States v. Oracle Corp., 
331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C 04-0807), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/cases/f205300/205388.htm (“Congress used the words ‘may be substantially 
to lessen competition’ . . . to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.” 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962))). A plaintiff need not 
show “even a high probability” that the proposed transaction will substantially lessen 
competition. FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he statute 
requires a prediction, and doubts are to be resolved against the transaction.”).  
 200. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Humana Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00464 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f281600/281618.pdf (“Unless 
enjoined, Humana’s proposed acquisition of Arcadian will substantially lessen competition 
in the sale of Medicare Advantage health insurance plans sold to Medicare-eligible 
individuals . . . in forty-five counties and parishes in Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
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One explanation is that courts, in accepting the Chicago school’s 
ideologies, demanded more evidence from the antitrust plaintiffs to 
overcome their belief of self-correcting markets.201  Plaintiffs had to 
explain how, and the extent to which, the prices for one or both of the 
merging firms’ products or services would increase post-merger, which in 
turn led the agencies to calculate diversion ratios, the estimated consumer 
demand at post-merger prices, and the profit margins of the merging 
parties.202  As one antitrust official observed: 
Judges are more accustomed to making decisions based on facts about 
what happened; in mergers, they are called on to predict what might 
happen in the future—something which I think a court is reluctant to do, 
especially when faced with a merger that may involve many products, 
only a small portion of which may be anticompetitive, and in the face of 
local businessmen and women addressing all the advantages of the 
merger, including claims of efficiencies. 
More and more when we go to court, the judges seem to be asking for 
concreteness; the anecdotal evidence seems less important to them than 
surveys, which seem systematic, but may be flawed.  If the issue is 
product market, the courts seem to want to know exactly how many 
customers would be willing to switch.  And if it’s competitive effects, 
they want to know how big an effect will result.  More and more, in order 
to persuade a court that a merger is going to be harmful, we feel the need 
to do the best we can to quantify. 
 
Oklahoma, and Texas”); Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, United States v. H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 
(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00948), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f273600/
273683.pdf (“The United States brings this action to block an acquisition that will 
substantially lessen competition in the tax preparation industry.”); Complaint, United States 
v. Cingular Wireless Corp., No. 1:04CV01850 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f205900/205969.htm; Complaint, United States v. Northrop 
Grumman Corp., No. 1:02CV02432 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/cases/f200500/200555.htm  (“Unless this transaction is blocked, Northrop’s 
acquisition of TRW will substantially lessen competition in the development and production 
of radar reconnaissance satellite systems and payloads and EO/IR reconnaissance satellite 
systems and payloads used by the United States, and will likely lead to an increase in prices 
and a reduction in quality and innovation for such satellites systems and payloads in 
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.”); Bernard M. 
Hollander, Returning to the Proper Standard Under Section 7, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (April 
5, 2010), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Hollander%20AAI%20piece_
040920101304.pdf. 
 201. See, e.g., First & Waller, supra note 170, at 2570–72 (discussing the agencies’ and 
courts’ focus on error costs, with a greater concern over false positives than negatives). 
 202. See Rachel Brandenburger & Joseph Matelis, The 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines:  A Historical and International Perspective, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/articles/280478.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); Carl Shapiro, The 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:  From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 701 (2010); see also DOJ & FTC COMMENTARY ON GUIDELINES, supra note 198, at 27 
(“In all merger cases, the Agencies focus on the particular competitive relationship between 
the merging firms, and for mergers involving differentiated products, the ‘diversion ratios’ 
between products combined by the merger are of particular importance.”). 
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So, in our investigations and case preparations we are asking both our 
economists and the parties what effects from the merger can be quantified 
and how we can best do it.203 
While some courts continued to cite the Philadelphia National Bank 
presumption and the incipiency standard,204 many went further in requiring 
the antitrust agencies to prove that a merger would cause prices to rise, and 
to explain the chain of events that would lead to the post-merger price 
increase (either unilateral or coordinated effects) and the price increase’s 
likely magnitude.205  Requiring such certainty and actuality of injury to 
competition are, of course, contrary to the statute’s plain language and its 
effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints. 
Nonetheless, the agencies’ merger review migrated toward assessing 
what was measurable—namely short-term pricing effects under unilateral 
effects theory and short-term productive efficiencies.206  As the agencies 
and courts increasingly focused on the merger’s short-term impact on 
 
 203. Constance K. Robinson, Dir. of Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., 
Quantifying Unilateral Effects in Investigations and Cases Before the George Mason Law 
Review Symposium—Antitrust in the Information Revolution:  New Economic Approaches 
for Analyzing Antitrust Issues (Oct. 11, 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/1005.htm. 
 204. See Polypore Int’l, Inc. v. FTC, 686 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Six 
W. Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 97 CIV. 5499 (DNE), 2000 WL 
264295, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2000) (“More alarming to this Court, though, is the 
vertical unification that the LCE merger caused between powerful distributors and 
exhibitors.  The Supreme Court warned that an important factor for a court to consider when 
assaying the legality of a merger is ‘the trend toward concentration in the industry.’” 
(quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332)). 
 205. See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (misconstruing the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the trial court held that 
“[w]ithout the benefit of presumptions, the burden remains upon plaintiffs to come forward 
with evidence of actual anticompetitive effects”); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 
109, 115 (D.D.C. 2004) (“To warrant injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, the challenged 
acquisition must be likely substantially to lessen competition. Although certainty is not 
required, Section 7 does demand that a plaintiff demonstrate that the substantial lessening of 
competition will be ‘sufficiently probable and imminent’ to warrant relief.” (citation 
omitted)), dismissed, 04-5291, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004). 
 206. Charles A. James, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Rediscovering Coordinated Effects, Address at the American Bar Association Annual 
Meeting, Section of Antitrust Law 7–8 (Aug. 13, 2002), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.pdf (noting that “one interesting side-effect of the 
1992 Guidelines has been the emergence of unilateral effects as the predominant theory of 
economic harm pursued in government merger investigations and challenges.”); Coordinated 
Effects Analysis:  The Arch Coal Decision, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Mar. 2005), http://www.
crai.com/uploadedFiles/RELATING_MATERIALS/Publications/Consultant_publications/D
ick/files/Coordinated%20Effects%20Analysis%20-%20The%20Arch%20Coal%20Decision
.pdf (quoting one former DOJ economist:  “Following the adoption of the 1992 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, coordinated effects analysis languished as an active instrument of merger 
review and enforcement.  Over the last decade, mergers were much more likely to be 
reviewed (or challenged) on the basis of unilateral effects concerns.  More often than not, 
when a merger complaint included a coordinated effects allegation, it had the flavor, if not 
the reality, of being an afterthought.”). 
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prices, other important concerns (such as dynamic efficiencies and systemic 
risk) were simply ignored.207 
Consequently, federal competition policy underwent a dramatic shift 
from 1960 to the policies we have today.  One positive development is that 
mergers’ likely efficiencies, once viewed with suspicion, were seen as a 
benefit.  But while competition policy historically distrusted the 
concentration of economic power and saw the importance of small 
companies in promoting dynamic efficiencies, the Court recently praised 
monopolies.208  Courts and agencies “no longer concern[ed] themselves 
with preventing bigness, and indeed tend[ed] instead to encourage large-
scale enterprise for efficiency’s sake.”209  Courts and antitrust agencies 
generally applied a light touch to merger review under a fear of false 
positives and a belief that many mergers promote efficiencies, even though 
the empirical literature suggests the contrary.210  While the efficiencies 
defense developed over the past thirty years, antitrust enforcers and courts 
did not account for post-merger inefficiencies or competitive distortions in 
creating firms too big and too integral to fail.211  As Professor Fox argues, 
“by trusting dominant firm strategies and leading firm collaborations to 
produce efficiency, modern U.S. antitrust protects monopoly and oligopoly, 
suppresses innovative challenges, and stifles efficiency.”212 
This change in competition policy did not arise from congressional 
amendment.  Instead, it came mostly from judges and political appointees. 
Although the political, social, and moral implications of concentrated 
economic power may be beyond quantification, Congress emphasized these 
concerns, and the Court once strived for simpler antitrust rules to arrest any 
trend toward concentration in its incipiency.213  But aside from a few media 
 
 207. Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 
(2010). 
 208. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
412 (2004); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 497 (criticizing the Court’s assumptions in Trinko). 
 209. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis:  
The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the “Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 264 (2011). 
 210. See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 
1527, 1560–61 (2011); OECD, Mergers and Dynamic Efficiencies, POLICY BRIEF, 6 (Sept. 
2008), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/48/41359037.pdf. 
 211. Markham, supra note 209, at 314. 
 212. Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT 
THE MARK:  THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 77 
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).   
 213. Despite the promise of better, more objective analysis, the economic welfare goals 
did not provide greater objectivity, transparency, administrability, and predictability to 
antitrust’s rule of reason standard.  The rule of reason has been routinely pilloried.  In the 
past decade, the Supreme Court has also complained about the state of federal antitrust law 
(e.g., the interminable litigation, inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase, and its 
fear over the unusually high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts).  But it was the 
Court that has created this predicament.  Over the past thirty years, the Court increasingly 
relied on its fact-specific weighing standard, the rule of reason, and a vague economic goal 
(consumer welfare) that accommodated different personal values and interpretation and often 
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mergers where the FCC haphazardly sought to promote noneconomic 
political and social values, U.S. merger policy over the past thirty years 
largely ignored competition policy’s noneconomic values.214 
B.  Reconciling the Consumer Welfare Standard 
and the Welfare of Consumers Currently 
As Part III.A discussed, competition policy’s noneconomic goals were 
deemphasized over the past thirty years in the pursuit of an unclear 
economic objective of promoting consumer welfare.  As I discuss 
elsewhere, consumer welfare cannot be antitrust’s sole or even primary 
objective.215  But this Part puts aside consumer welfare’s infirmities, and 
asks whether competition policy over the past thirty years indeed promoted 
consumers’ welfare.  Given antitrust’s broad applicability and the federal 
courts’ free reign under the Court’s rule of reason standard in construing the 
competition laws, has consumer welfare increased? 
The best way to answer this is to compare consumers’ welfare today with 
that in the counterfactual world where competition policy promoted 
multiple objectives.  Regrettably we cannot correct the policy failures over 
the past thirty years.  Only rough proxies, such as examining various 
metrics of consumer well-being over time, are available. 
Most Americans fortunately do not face hunger216 or homelessness.217 
One of the few well-being metrics where America excels is the average 
material well-being.  The average household disposable income in the 
 
pointed to no particular course of action. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason 
Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009). 
 214. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 128–29; Bush, supra note 191, at 279; Maurice E. Stucke 
& Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249 (2001); 
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition Policy for the Media:  
The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies That Support the Media Sector’s Unique 
Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101 (2009). 
 215. For one, no consensus exists in defining or measuring consumer welfare or 
designing legal standards to further this goal. Stucke, Goals, supra note 8, at 574; see also 
Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 (2013) (noting how 
the term has no particular meaning).  For another, a consumer welfare objective cannot 
explain antitrust enforcement against buyer cartels or monopsonies without downstream 
effects on consumers. Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 
62 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094553.  If 
promoting consumer surplus is the sole goal, then consumers arguably could collude to 
depress prices for goods and services (such as rigging bids at home foreclosure sales).  Such 
conduct is illegal. 
 216. The percentage of American households that had access to enough food for an 
active, healthy lifestyle ranged between 89 percent (2005) and 85.3 percent (2009). U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2012, tbl.214, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0214.pdf. The percentage of 
households having difficulty meeting basic food needs ranged between 6.9 percent (2005) 
and 9 percent (2009). Id. 
 217. NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 
2012 (2012), available at http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-of-
homelessness-in-america-2012 (estimating that the U.S. homeless population “decreased 1 
percent, or by about 7,000 people . . . from 643,067 in 2009 to 636,017 in 2011”). 
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United States in 2008 was $37,690 per year, and the average U.S. 
household’s financial worth was an estimated $98,440, which were much 
higher than the OECD averages, $22,284 and $36,808, respectively.218  
Updating for the Great Recession, the median U.S. household income in 
2011 was $50,054.219 
Americans’ discretionary income increased, as the percentage of 
expenditures allocated for food, clothing, and housing declined: 
In 1901, the average U.S. family devoted 79.8 percent of its spending to 
these necessities, while families in New York City spent 80.3 percent, and 
families in Boston allocated 86.0 percent.  By 2002–03, allocations on 
necessities had been reduced substantially, for U.S. families to 50.1 
percent of spending, for New York City families to 56.7 percent, and for 
Boston families to 53.8 percent.220 
On the other hand, the U.S. economy over the past thirty years has failed 
for many Americans in terms of openness, inclusiveness, positive economic 
impact, and sustainable development.221  Dated policy paradigms presumed 
trade-offs between economic efficiency and social progress.222  Companies 
overlooked the “well-being of their customers, the depletion of natural 
resources vital to their businesses, the viability of key suppliers, [and] the 
economic distress of the communities in which they produce and sell.”223 
1.  The Widening Inequality Gap and Declining Social Mobility 
A competition policy’s consumer welfare standard in theory should 
inhibit the transfer of wealth from consumers to firms with significant 
market power.  Income and wealth inequality, however, have increased 
significantly over the past thirty years.224  Wealth inequality was a historic 
 
 218. United States, OECD BETTER LIFE INITIATIVE, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/
countries/united-states/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 219. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, P60–243, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  2011, at 5 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 CENSUS], available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf. 
 220. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 100 YEARS OF U.S. 
CONSUMER SPENDING DATA FOR THE NATION, NEW YORK CITY, AND BOSTON 66 (2006), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/report991.pdf. 
 221. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at xii. 
 222. Porter & Kramer, supra note 1, at 64. 
 223. Id. 
 224. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 6 (EPI Digital, 12th ed. 
2012), available at http://stateofworkingamerica.org/subjects/overview/?reader (observing 
that wages earned by the top 1 percent “grew about 156 percent between 1979 and 2007, 
whereas wages for the bottom 90 percent rose by less than 17 percent”).  Economists have 
documented the distinctive U-shaped pattern of income disparity between 1917 and 2007. 
Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer:  The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States 
(updated with 2011 estimates), BERKELEY (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.econ.berkeley.
edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2011.pdf.  Peaking in 1928, income disparity sharply 
declined during the Great Depression.  Thereafter, “[b]etween 1947 and 1973, economic 
growth was both rapid and distributed equally across income classes.” Econ. Pol’y Inst., 
Income Inequality, ST. WORKING AM., http://stateofworkingamerica.org/inequality/income-
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antitrust concern.  Senator Sherman, in support of his legislation, identified 
the inequality of condition, wealth, and opportunity as the greatest threat to 
social order, and stated that this inequality “has grown within a single 
generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to 
control production and trade and to break down competition.”225  But 
income inequality, The Economist recently described in its special report, is 
“on a scale that matches, or even exceeds, the first Gilded Age.”226 
Wealth and income inequality in the United States is approaching levels 
seen in plutocracies.227  The OECD notes: 
The wealthiest Americans have collected the bulk of the past three 
decades’ income gains.  The share of national income of the richest 1% 
more than doubled between 1980 and 2008 . . . [while] the top marginal 
income tax rate dropped from 70% in 1981 to 35% in 2010.228 
In 2010, the United States had “the fourth highest rate of income inequality 
and relative poverty (17.3% of people [are] poor compared to an OECD 
average of 11.1%) in the OECD.”229  Although the disparity between the 
rich and poor widened globally,230 the OECD observed, “nowhere has this 
trend been so stark as in the United States.”231  Income inequality increased 
during the Obama Administration—growing 1.6 percent in one year alone 
(between 2010 and 2011),232 and 5.2 percent since 1993.233 
Similarly, wealth inequality is at a record high.234  In 1962, “the 
wealthiest 1% of households averaged 125 times the wealth of the median 
 
inequality/.  “The poorest 20% of families saw growth at least as fast as the richest 20% of 
families, and everybody in between experienced similar rates of income growth.” Id.  But in 
the late 1970s, income inequality in the United States began growing, reaching a record high 
in 2007. Anthony B. Atkinson et al., Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 3, 6 (2011) (noting how the share of total pre-tax income going to the top decile 
income group reached almost 50 percent by 2007, the highest level on record, with a 
significant change in the top one percentile, which rose from 8.9 percent of total pre-tax 
income in 1976 to 23.5 percent in 2007). 
 225. 21 CONG. REC. 2454, 2460 (1890). 
 226. Special Report:  For Richer, For Poorer, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2012, at 2 
[hereinafter Special Report]. 
 227. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 22. 
 228. OECD, Country Note:  United States, in DIVIDED WE STAND:  WHY INEQUALITY 
KEEPS RISING (2011), available at www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/49170253.pdf. 
 229. OECD, Key Findings:  United States, in SOCIETY AT A GLANCE—OECD SOCIAL 
INDICATORS (2011), available at www.oecd.org/social/socialpoliciesanddata/47573390.pdf. 
 230. Angel Gurría, OECD Sec’y Gen., Remarks at Press Conf. for Divided We Stand:  
Inequality Keeps Rising (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/social/divided
westandwhyinequalitykeepsrisingspeech.htm (“Income inequality in OECD countries is at 
its highest level for the past half century.”). 
 231. OECD, Country Note:  United States, in GROWING UNEQUAL?:  INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY IN OECD COUNTRIES 1 (2008), available at http://www.oecd
.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/41528678.pdf. 
 232. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 219, at 7, 8 (Gini index increasing from 0.470 to 0.477); 
Special Report, supra note 226, at 8 (more than 90 percent of all income gains since the 
recession went to the top 1 percent). 
 233. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 219, at 10. 
 234. SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO, ECON. POLICY INST., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA’S 
WEALTH, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.epi.org/page/-/BriefingPaper292.pdf.  
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household.”235  By 2009, the wealth disparity nearly doubled as “the 
wealthiest 1% of households averaged 225 times the wealth of the median 
household.”236  Indeed, all households—except those in the top 5 percent—
saw a relative decline in share of overall wealth between 1962 and 2009.237  
In 2009, the richest 20 percent of American households accumulated 87.2 
percent of household net wealth, the remaining 80 percent of American 
households accounted for 12.8 percent of all wealth, and approximately one 
in every four American households had no (or a negative) net worth.238 
A bigger issue is fairness.  Contrary to this Horatio Alger myth, income 
mobility is lower (and income inequality greater) in America than in many 
European239 and other developed countries.240  One 2008 study found that 
“Americans do not have an equal shot at getting ahead, and one’s chances 
are largely dependent on one’s parents’ economic position.”241  The study 
noted that “[c]hildren born to parents in the top quintile have the highest 
likelihood of attaining the top, and children born to parents in the bottom 
quintile have the highest likelihood of being in the bottom themselves.”242 
Along with increasing income inequality came poverty.243  Many more 
Americans are impoverished.244  In 2010, over 46 million people were in 
poverty, “the largest number in the 52 years for which poverty estimates 
 
 235. Id. at 7. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 5. 
 238. Id. at 2.  Median wealth for African-American households saw an even greater 
decline in both absolute dollars ($4,890 in 2010 versus $6,366 in 1983) and relative to white 
households ($97,000 in 2010). MISHEL ET AL., supra note 224, at 40–41. 
 239. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 18; Like Father, Not Like Son, in Special Report, supra 
note 226, at 7. 
 240. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 224, at 33–35; Miles Corak, Do Poor Children Become 
Poor Adults? Lessons from a Cross Country Comparison of Generational Earnings Mobility 
(Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 1993, 2006), available at 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp1993.pdf; Markus Jäntti et al., American Exceptionalism in a New Light:  
A Comparison of Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the Nordic Countries, the United 
Kingdom and the United States 27 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 
1938, 2006), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp1938.pdf; OECD, ARE WE GROWING 
UNEQUAL? 7 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/56/41494435.pdf 
(“Taking the analysis of persistence of income poverty and mobility of earnings between 
generations together suggests that more unequal countries are prone to developing an 
‘underclass’ who are poor themselves for long periods and so are their children.”).  
 241. Julia B. Isaacs, BROOKINGS INST., Economic Mobility of Families Across 
Generations, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND:  ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 15–
19 (2008). 
 242. Id.; see also MISHEL ET AL., supra note 224, at 34 (measuring the intergenerational 
elasticity between parental income and 40-to-44-year-old sons’ earning as declining from 
0.40 in 1950 to 0.32 in 1980, and increasing to 0.46 in 1990 and 0.58 in 2000). 
 243. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 219, at 13, fig.4 (showing sharp inclines in the number of 
people living in poverty between the late 1970s and 1984, 1989 and 1993, and 2000 and 
2010).  The percentage of U.S. families below poverty declined from 20.8 percent in 1959 to 
9.7 percent in 1973. Id. at 13.  It fluctuated between 9.9 percent and 10.9 percent between 
1974 and 1979, and grew from 11.5 percent (1980) to 13.9 percent (1983). Id. 
 244. Id. at 13 (noting that the official poverty rate in 2011 was 15 percent (46.2 million 
people)).  For African Americans and Hispanics, the 2011 poverty rates were 27.6 percent 
and 25.3 percent. Id. at 15. 
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have been published.”245  In 2010, 20.5 million people (6.7 percent of the 
U.S. population) “lived below half of the poverty line (below $11,157 for a 
family of four)”—the highest level on record.246 
This might have come as a shock to some, but not to many middle and 
lower income households.  Well before 2008, middle-class Americans saw 
little gains in income despite gains in productivity.247  Unlike the period 
between WWII and the 1970s, between 1979 and 2011, wages and 
productivity did not increase in tandem.248  Real median household income 
stagnated in the 2000s, with the 2011 median 8.9 percent below the 1999 
median.249  When mass unemployment came, the middle class shrank 
further.250  Neighborhoods over the past thirty years have become more 
segregated by income.251 
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segregation-by-income/. 
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This widening inequality gap and declining social mobility raise other 
concerns, including slower economic growth, greater inefficiency from 
rent-seeking, weaker demand, limited opportunity for many people, and 
more financial crises.252 
2.  America’s Threadbare Social Net 
Besides exposing the widening gap between the wealthiest 1 percent and 
the rest of America, the economic crisis exposed America’s threadbare 
social net.253  America’s infrastructure is crumbling.254  Primary and 
secondary education for many families is inadequate.255  Incarcerations,256 
home foreclosures,257 underwater mortgages,258 and the public’s 
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dissatisfaction with Congress reached record highs.259  With America’s debt 
in the trillions of dollars,260 a larger fiscal crisis looms. 
My point is not that America’s feeble antitrust enforcement primarily 
caused the current economic blight.  Not every harm to consumers stems 
from an injury to competition that the competition laws redress.  Others, 
like Joseph Stiglitz, have argued that the plight of the middle class and 
poor, the growing income and wealth inequality, and the widening gap 
between worker pay and increases in productivity were caused in part by 
our failed competition policies.261  My point here is that, over the past thirty 
years, it is hard to see how antitrust’s consumer welfare objective actually 
promoted the welfare of 99 percent of Americans. 
3.  Concerns Over Crony Capitalism 
Like the concern preceding the Sherman Act’s enactment in 1890, the 
concern today is the alignment between big government and big business, 
and how federal policies are skewed toward helping the wealthy and 
powerful.262  As Stiglitz recently argued, 
We haven’t achieved the minimalist state that libertarians advocate.  What 
we’ve achieved is a state too constrained to provide the public goods—
investments in infrastructure, technology, and education—that would 
make for a vibrant economy and too weak to engage in the redistribution 
that is needed to create a fair society.  But we have a state that is still large 
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enough and distorted enough that it can provide a bounty of gifts to the 
wealthy.263 
Many Americans in recent surveys were dissatisfied with the federal 
government,264 its size and power,265 the country’s moral and ethical 
climate,266 and the state of America’s economy.267  Many distrust the 
federal government268 and big business.269  Many believe there is “too 
much power in the hands of a few rich people and large corporations in the 
United States.”270  Many “say the economic system in this country unfairly 
favors the wealthy.”271  Many feel that the federal economic policies since 
2008 have favored—either a great deal or a fair amount—large banks and 
financial institutions (74% surveyed), large corporations (70%), and the 
wealthy (57%), while not favoring the poor (31%), the middle class (27%), 
or small businesses (23%).272  Many believe the tax system favors the 
rich.273  Some wealthy taxpayers are also dissatisfied with the tax 
inequities.274  One concern is that 
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(2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/17/labor-unions-seen-as-good-for-
workers-not-u-s-competitiveness/. Opinions about business corporations turned more 
negative among Republicans (58 percent viewing corporations favorably and 36 percent 
unfavorably in February 2011 versus 70 percent in January 2007 viewing corporations 
favorably and 18 percent unfavorably). Id. 
 270. Andrew Kohut, Op-Ed., Don’t Mind the Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at A27. 
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the current imbalance of power between mega-corporations and all other 
institutions and individuals in the world constitutes a danger to peace, 
health and prosperity. While the protesters in the Middle East rebel 
against powerful repressive governments, participants in the Occupy Wall 
Street protests share a perspective that a relatively small group of 
corporate and wealthy individuals now wield too much economic 
influence and control in the United States and the world.275 
Many supported the Occupy Wall Street movement.276  Over four 
hundred economists supported Occupy Wall Street in “liberat[ing] the 
economy from the short-term greed of the rich and powerful one 
percent.”277  Students are questioning a conservative bias in economics 
itself.278  As economist Robert J. Shiller observes, “I teach financial 
markets, and it’s a little like teaching R.O.T.C. during the Vietnam War. . . .  
You have this sense that something’s amiss.”279 
4.  Dissatisfaction with Competition Policy 
Professor Pitofsky presciently warned in 1979 that, 
if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under 
antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result 
will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be 
impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic 
affairs.280   
One need only look at the financial services industry to see his prediction 
bear out.281  The taxpayer bailouts of the major financial institutions, 
automobile manufacturers, AIG, and other large corporations exposed how 
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the economically powerful have every desire to use the government to 
protect their economic interests.282 
For many, the economic crisis exposed the relationship between the big 
financial firms and big government.283  A 2012 study found that, “[a]mong 
the middle class, about six-in-ten (62%) blame lawmakers ‘a lot’ for the 
problems of the middle class.  Somewhat smaller shares blame banks and 
financial institutions (54%) and large corporations (47%).”284  Fifty-six 
percent of surveyed Americans said that the power and influence of banks 
and other financial institutions represented a major threat to the country.285 
This was not always the case.  With an emphasis on structural banking 
regulations and antitrust merger review,286 the Supreme Court in the 1960s 
celebrated the federal supervision of banking as one of the most, if not the 
most, successful systems of economic regulation.287  Commercial banking 
at that time was diffused through many independent, local banks, rather 
than concentrated in a few nationwide banks, as in England and 
Germany.288  Commercial banking was subject to various state and federal 
governmental controls.289  Add to that antitrust merger review, which, 
consistent with the Clayton Act’s legislative political and social values, 
sought to arrest anticompetitive tendencies and trends toward concentration 
in their incipiency.290  In fact, in 1963, the Court noted the “virtual 
disappearance of bank failures from the American economic scene.”291 
But that changed in the 1980s.  With lax merger review and banking 
deregulation, beginning in the 1980s, the financial services industry 
underwent a wave of record-setting megamergers.292  Around 400 to 500 
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banks each year between 1986 and 1998 ceased to exist independently.293  
The DOJ observed that the megamergers ranked “among the largest U.S. 
bank mergers ever, in terms of the real value of assets involved, and in 
terms of the share of total U.S. bank assets accounted for by the merging 
banks.”294   
But the federal government did little to arrest this trend toward 
concentration and mergers that created banks too big to fail.  In considering 
only the bank mergers’ claimed short-term productive efficiencies and price 
effects in narrowly defined markets (namely small business loans), the DOJ 
did not consider other economic, political, and social costs from trends 
toward concentration.295  The DOJ discounted or ignored the dangers of 
concentration, the mergers’ impact on systemic risk, and their impact on the 
financial system’s overall efficiency, competitiveness, and stability.296  One 
official recounted how the DOJ required divestitures in only five of the 
1,900 bank mergers it screened in 1995.297  The DOJ assured the bankers 
that despite challenging only 0.3 percent of reviewed bank mergers, the 
DOJ “successfully prevented anticompetitive effects from bank mergers, 
ensuring that competitive options are preserved while at the same time 
permitting most of the efficiencies associated with those mergers . . . .  In 
sum, bank merger policy in the ’90s is a win-win situation for all.”298 
Take for example the 1998 merger between Travelers Group Inc. and 
Citicorp, which created the world’s largest commercial banking 
organization, with total consolidated assets of approximately $751 billion.  
During its merger review, the DOJ, according to one official, “heard 
numerous complaints that Citigroup [the proposed merged entity] would 
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have an undue aggregation of resources—that the deal would create[] a firm 
too big to be allowed to fail.”299  But the DOJ “essentially viewed this as 
primarily a regulatory issue to be considered by the [Federal Reserve 
Board].”300  The Federal Reserve Board dismissed this and several other 
concerns, which presaged the financial crisis a decade later.  Both the DOJ 
and Federal Reserve ignored concerns that the merger “would result in an 
undue concentration of resources and in an organization that is both ‘too big 
to fail’ and ‘too big to supervise.’”301 
With lax antitrust review and deregulation, the financial services 
industries became highly concentrated after the merger wave of the 1980s 
and 1990s.  JPMorgan Chase, for example, arose from mergers involving 
eleven financial institutions; Bank of America from thirteen institutions; 
and Wells Fargo from nine institutions.302  As it consolidated, the financial 
services industry commanded a higher share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and overall corporate profits.303  Between 2001 and 2010, average 
compensation in the finance sector was 70 to 90 percent higher than in other 
industries, and for those in investment banking and securities dealing, their 
average compensation was 300 to 450 percent higher.304  As a result, 
investment bankers comprised a larger share of the wealthiest 0.1 percent 
than other senior executives.305 
Today, six bank holding companies—Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank 
of America, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—dominate 
the industry and are considered “too big and too integral to fail” (TBTF).  In 
the third quarter of 2010, the assets of these six bank holding companies 
were worth 64 percent of GDP—higher than in 2006 (about 55 percent of 
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rate; between 1980 and 2005, however, the financial sector’s profits increased 800 percent, 
whereas other sectors grew 250 percent. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 60. 
 304. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 303, at 110.  In 1989, the chief 
executives at the seven largest bank holding companies “earned an average of $2.8 million, 
or 97 times the median U.S. household income of $28,906 for that year.” Id.  By 2007, the 
CEOs at the six largest bank holding companies “earned an average of $26 million, or 516 
times the [2007] median household income of $50,233,” and “2.3 times the average total 
compensation of the CEOs at the top 50 nonbank companies.” Id. at 110–11. 
 305. Special Report, supra note 226, at 10 (“America’s top 25 hedge-fund managers 
make more [money] than all the CEOs of the S&P 500 combined.”). 
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GDP) and 1995 (17 percent of GDP).306  In contrast, the combined assets of 
all commercial banks in 1978 were worth 53 percent of GDP.307  Similarly, 
the four largest U.S. commercial banking firms (Bank of America, Wells 
Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup) account for over 34 percent of 
national deposits and over 56 percent of the market in general purpose 
credit card purchase volume; they originated roughly 58 percent of 
mortgage loans by volume in 2009 and serviced 56.3 percent of such 
loans.308  In contrast, the twenty-five largest banks accounted for only 29.1 
percent of deposits in 1980.309  Ironically, as a result of mergers during the 
financial crisis, the big six became even bigger,310 and the industry became 
more concentrated as nonbank mortgage lenders exited.311 
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, among others, 
recommended, “If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big. . . .  In 1911 we 
broke up Standard Oil—so what happened?  The individual parts became 
more valuable than the whole.  Maybe that’s what we need to do.”312  But 
the reality is that the political will and accountability to break up these firms 
are absent. 
This dissatisfaction over antitrust enforcement is not confined to the 
financial services industry.  In 2010, the DOJ and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) held public workshops on competition issues affecting 
the agricultural sector.313  The agencies heard many complaints about the 
state of antitrust enforcement.  In Alabama, they heard how the “‘lack of 
antitrust enforcement in recent decades’ has resulted in ‘a severely 
concentrated marketplace in which power and profit are limited to a few at 
 
 306. Simon Johnson, The Bill Daley Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2011, 8:08 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-johnson/bill-daley-obama-chief-of-staff_b_806
341.html. 
 307. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 59. 
 308. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING 
CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES 13, 24 (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/Study%20on%20
Concentration%20Limits%20on%20Large%20Firms%2001-17-11.pdf. 
 309. MERGERS & BANKING 1980–98, supra note 292, at 26; SANDERS, supra note 253, at 
37–38. 
 310. Richard W. Fisher, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Remarks Before 
the Senior Delegates Roundtable of the Fixed Income Forum, Two Areas of Present 
Concern:  The Economic Outlook and the Pathology of Too-Big-To-Fail (July 23, 2009), 
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2009/fs090723.cfm (with 
reference to Errol Flynn, Johnny Mercer, Gary Stern, and Voltaire) (“Bank of America’s 
assets grew 51 percent from June 2007 to March 2009, assisted in no small part by its 
acquisitions of Countrywide Financial and Merrill. Wells Fargo’s asset base grew 138 
percent, thanks mainly to its acquisition of Wachovia.  J.P. Morgan Chase acquired both 
Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual and grew 43 percent.”). 
 311. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 159–64, 171, 180. 
 312. Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking 
Up Large Banks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:50 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=email_en&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg. 
 313. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE:  VOICES FROM THE 
WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY 
ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD (2012) [hereinafter DOJ AG REPORT], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf. 
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the expense of countless, hard working family farmers.’”314  In Wisconsin, 
they heard how a recent enforcement action (Dean Foods’ acquisition of 
plants from Foremost Farms) was an “anomaly,” when “‘a lot of mega-
mergers’ . . . ‘have allowed a lot of concentration of market power.’”315  
They heard from Wisconsin’s Secretary of Agriculture that “as with the big 
banks and big oil and big mining, it’s long been evident that meaningful 
enforcement of antitrust and anticoncentration policy [regulations] in our 
food and [agricultural] industry have been sadly missing in recent 
decades.”316  The participants found it “‘appalling that our antitrust 
enforcement has not been more vigorous than it has been in the past.’”317  
One “panelist charged that ‘merger policy has been broken for 10 years, if 
not 20 or 30.’”318 
C.  Should Competition Law Maximize Consumer Welfare? 
One response is that even if competition policy contributed to the dismal 
economic state of many Americans, the problem did not arise from 
competition policy’s consumer welfare objective.  Rather, antitrust’s legal 
standards and enforcement have failed to effectuate the consumer welfare 
objective.  Rather than displace the consumer welfare objective, the courts 
and agencies need only recalibrate antitrust’s legal standards and 
enforcement to better promote consumers’ welfare. 
This raises a more challenging issue.  Suppose courts and enforcers could 
agree that maximizing consumer welfare is antitrust’s sole or primary 
objective; could agree on a definition of consumer welfare (such as 
increasing consumer surplus319); and could design administrable legal 
standards for evaluating restraints or mergers that posed a significant risk of 
increased market power and lower consumer surplus.320  Would Americans’ 
 
 314. Id. at 5. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Transcript of Proceedings at Public Workshops Exploring Competition Issues in 
Agriculture:  Dairy Workshop 38 (June 25, 2010) (statement of Rod Nilsestuen, Wis. Sec’y 
of Agric.), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/wisconsin-
agworkshop-transcript.pdf. 
 317. DOJ AG REPORT, supra note 313, at 5. 
 318. Id.  
 319. OECD, supra note 50, at 28 (defining consumer surplus as the “excess of social 
valuation of product over the price actually paid,” and “is measured by the area of a triangle 
below a demand curve and above the observed price”).  For example:  suppose you are 
willing to pay $25 for a book, which when you go to the bookstore is on sale for $15; your 
consumer surplus is $10. 
 320. Although this Article uses as a shorthand “promoting consumer surplus,” U.S. 
antitrust policy does not seek to increase consumer surplus per se.  For example, a monopoly 
can charge a higher than competitive price without violating the Sherman Act.  Indeed, the 
extra profits may serve as an incentive to invest in research and development.  Instead 
antitrust law seeks to enjoin mergers and restraints of trade that “create, enhance, or entrench 
market power or to facilitate its exercise.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.  So, antitrust policy 
targets mergers and restraints that enable firms “to raise price, reduce output, diminish 
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well-being significantly increase as a result?  The happiness economics 
literature suggests no. 
1.  Increasing a Wealthy Society’s Overall Wealth Does Not Necessarily 
Increase Overall Well-Being 
One insight from the happiness literature is that well-being is promoted 
along multiple dimensions, including (i) material well-being (income and 
wealth, housing, and jobs and earnings) and (ii) quality of life (health status, 
work and life balance, education and skills, social connections, civic 
engagement and governance, environmental quality, and personal 
security.321 
A competition policy that seeks to increase consumer surplus and thereby 
increase material well-being makes more sense in developing economies 
where most consumers have insufficient wealth to satisfy their most basic 
needs.322  After all, if impoverished consumers must choose between milk 
and bread, then with all else equal, lowering the price of milk and bread 
significantly benefits consumers’ health and well-being. 
But if competition policy’s sole or primary goal is to maximize consumer 
surplus in a post-industrial economy where many are materially well-off, 
then the competition policy has a minor, or at times inconsequential, role in 
maximizing total well-being.  Increasing consumer surplus will not always 
increase total well-being.  The happiness economics literature shows that 
after one’s basic needs are met, increasing income does not significantly 
increase experienced, day-to-day happiness.323  As the country’s living 
standards increase and its citizens’ basic material needs, such as food, 
clothing and shelter, are met, then the citizens will likely place greater 
importance on quality-of-life factors associated with well-being, such as 
work and life balance, social connections, safety, and environmental 
quality.324  Material well-being still matters (especially employment) in 
promoting well-being.  Economic growth can also promote other values, 
such as “openness of opportunity, tolerance, economic and social mobility, 
 
innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or 
incentives.” Id.  Thus, if a firm by acquiring its rival can raise prices above competitive 
levels, consumer surplus will be lost.  It is in this manner that this Article means promoting 
consumer surplus. 
 321. Better Life Initiative:  Compendium of OECD Well-Being Indicators, OECD, 6 
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_201185_47916764_1_1_1_1,00
.html; see also Hall et al., supra note 59, at 8–10, 17. 
 322. Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing 
Illusion, 312 SCIENCE 1908, 1909 (2006) (life satisfaction tends to rise when GDP per capita 
is at preexisting low levels of income, but tapers off once GDP per capita exceeds $12,000). 
 323. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 17; Elizabeth Dunn et al., Spending Money on Others 
Promotes Happiness, 319 SCIENCE 1687, 1687 (2008); Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 409–
10. 
 324. Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909. 
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fairness, and democracy.”325  But there is less bang (in terms of increased 
well-being) for that extra buck of consumer surplus. 
First, individuals assess their life satisfaction differently than their 
financial condition—the two are not coextensive.326  Second, higher income 
is more strongly correlated with life satisfaction than experienced, day-to-
day happiness.  In the United States, higher-income individuals (those in the 
highest decile) reported, on average, the highest level of happiness.327  But 
increases in income beyond a certain amount (one study found $75,000) did 
not promote the residents’ experienced, day-to-day happiness.328 
Third, after many citizens’ basic needs are met, the empirical literature 
does not conclusively find a strong correlation between increases in 
society’s wealth and subjective well-being.329  For example, the mean 
income (adjusted for inflation) of the top decile in the United States 
increased 33 percent between 1972 and 1996, but the mean happiness rating 
for that wealthy group remained the same.330  The Easterlin Paradox, 
named for Professor Easterlin’s 1974 article, finds that “a higher rise in 
personal income leads to higher subjective well-being for that person, but 
that a rise in average incomes for a country does not give rise to a 
corresponding increase in the country’s average subjective well-being.”331  
The economic literature, for example, did not identify a correlation between 
the doubling of wealth in the United States between 1945 and 1991 and 
 
 325. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ix 
(2005); see also id. at 79–102.  On a macro level, as Professor Friedman describes, whenever 
America was mired in economic stagnation its democratic values stagnated as well (with the 
exception of the Great Depression).  Hostility toward immigrants, the poor, and other 
competing groups, whether by nationality, religion, race, or gender, increased as these 
groups were seemingly threatened by others stealing their fixed or dwindling share of the 
pie.  In contrast, during periods of economic growth, our society slowly progressed from this 
zero-sum mentality toward openness, mobility, and democracy. 
 326. Van Praag et al., supra note 117, at 1012, 1014 (84 percent of surveyed were 
satisfied or very much satisfied with their lives, while only 53 percent very satisfied with 
their financial condition). 
 327. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 410 (showing that on a three-point scale ranging 
from not too happy (1), pretty happy (2), and very happy (3), the tenth decile between 1994 
and 1996 had a mean happiness rating of 2.36, which was slightly higher than the ninth 
decile’s mean of 2.3); Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909. 
 328. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 396–97; Kahneman & Deaton, supra note 99, at 
16,491 (looking to a U.S. survey of subjective well-being and finding that, beyond 
approximately $75,000, higher income “is neither the road to experienced happiness nor the 
road to the relief of unhappiness or stress, although higher income continues to improve 
individuals’ life evaluations”). 
 329. ADAIR TURNER, ECONOMICS AFTER THE CRISIS:  OBJECTIVES AND MEANS xii, 3–11 
(2012). 
 330. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 410. 
 331. OECD, supra note 17, at 271; see also BOK, supra note 12, at 10–16 (discussing 
Easterlin paradox, and responses thereto); FREY, supra note 12, at 38–41; Rafael Di Tella & 
Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics, J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 
(2006) (“[A] similar pattern has been observed in a large number of countries, including 
France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, and for different periods of time.  In 
Japan, income rose by a multiple of five between 1958 and 1987, and happiness remained 
stationary.”). 
 2628 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
greater well-being.332  So even where income is correlated with one 
dimension of well-being, relative, rather than absolute, income may be the 
determining factor.333  Mixed results were found in other countries.  China, 
for example, experienced rapid economic growth between 1994 and 2005 
(“real income per capita increasing by a factor of 2.5”) and greater material 
well-being (e.g., “ownership of color television sets rose from 40 percent of 
households to 82 percent, and the fraction with a telephone jumped from 10 
percent to 63 percent”); nonetheless the Chinese people have expressed 
greater dissatisfaction.334 Other studies, however, have found in several 
European countries that the citizens’ life satisfaction increased with the 
growth in per capita GDP.335 Consequently, for wealthy developed 
countries, “the relationship between average income and human well-
being,” remains, as one economist observes, “uncertain and complex.”336 
One recent study of well-being across poorer and wealthier countries 
found a shift from materialist to post-materialist well-being.337  As 
countries become wealthier, individual well-being tends to become more 
post-materialist338:  “The more widespread post-materialist values are in a 
society, the more the citizenry values personal autonomy, relative to 
income, as a source of [subjective well-being].”339  People now derive 
greater satisfaction from job creativity than income.340  And “[i]n richer 
countries, personal autonomy drives life satisfaction—relative to income—
more strongly.”341  In short, “money matters less in richer countries.”342 
So competition policies’ goals must evolve accordingly.  The goal can no 
longer be maximizing consumer surplus at the expense or in lieu of other 
important quality-of-life factors (such as individual freedoms, autonomy, 
 
 332. BOK, supra note 12, at 11–12; LAYARD, supra note 12, at 29–30. 
 333. Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 98 (noting that, “if the relative income effect 
dominates the absolute income effect, this would explain why cross section data show that 
wealthier individuals within a society are happier, but that average SWB levels remain 
constant as all members become wealthier”); see also OECD, supra note 17, at 276 (noting 
the nonlinear relationship between life satisfaction and income). 
 334. Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at 15–16. 
 335. Daniel W. Sacks et al., The New Stylized Facts About Income and Subjective Well-
Being 9 (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 7105, 2012), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp7105.pdf 
(explaining that, in eight of the nine E.U. countries, economic growth has been accompanied 
to different degrees with rising average well-being).  In the United States, however, life 
satisfaction has decreased since 1972, even though GDP approximately doubled during that 
time. Id. at 10; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 149 (finding from the more 
recent research that the “Easterlin paradox does not apply to cross-country comparisons of 
life evaluations at the world level” and in one study of eighteen countries found a 0.58 
correlation between changes in GDP and ladder-of-life scores over thirty years). 
 336. TURNER, supra note 329, at 9. 
 337. Jan Delhey, From Materialist to Post-materialist Happiness?  National Affluence 
and Determinants of Life Satisfaction in Cross-national Perspective, 97 SOC. INDICATORS 
RES. 65, 74–77 (2010). 
 338. Id. at 74. 
 339. Id. at 73. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 74. 
 342. Id. at 76–77. 
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environmental protection, and democracy).  The incremental gains in total 
well-being come not from more luxury goods at lower prices, but in 
fostering market relations that promote other-regarding civic virtues.343 
2.  Why Promoting Consumer Surplus Does Not Necessarily 
Promote Consumer Welfare 
Several factors suggest why promoting consumer surplus in a post-
industrial economy where many are materially well-off will not necessarily 
promote consumer welfare, and any competition policy with this as its sole 
or primary aim will be ineffective at accomplishing its goals. 
First, promoting consumer surplus treats all forms of consumption as 
positive even though consumption can harm the user and society (such as 
with cigarettes).344  Consider obesity.  While nutrition remains an issue, 
only 1.8 percent of Americans in 2007–08, based on their body mass index 
(BMI), were underweight and only 31.6 percent were at a healthy weight.345  
Most Americans were overweight (33.9%) or obese (32.6%).  In 
comparison, 17 percent of the OECD member countries are obese.346  
Granted, problems exist with relying on BMI,347 but muscularity does not 
bedevil many Americans.  Between 1980 and 2009, America’s per capita 
consumption increased for corn sweeteners (35.3 to 65.7 pounds), caloric 
sweeteners (120.2 to 130.7 pounds), and total fat content (56.9 to 78.6 
pounds).348  How important then is promoting consumer surplus and 
reducing the deadweight welfare loss for snack cakes,349 carbonated soft 
drinks,350 salted snack foods,351 or superpremium ice cream?352  If obese 
citizens have lower well-being levels and lower levels of income mobility 
on average than those not obese,353 why promote consumer surplus (and 
output) for unhealthy foods?  The rationale is that competition law, absent 
any immunities or exemptions, applies to all industries.354  The agencies or 
 
 343. See Sargent, supra note 128, at 52 (discussing Antonio Genovesi’s work). 
 344. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 11. 
 345. U.S. Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Age-Adjusted Percent Distributions of Body 
Mass Index (BMI) Among Persons 18 Years Old and over by Selected Characteristics: 
2007–2008, CENSUS tbl.211, www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0211.xls 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 346. OECD, supra note 17, at 113. 
 347. Linda Tarr Kent, Problems with the BMI Index, LIVESTRONG.COM (May 6, 2010), 
http://www.livestrong.com/article/117703-problems-bmi-index/.  
 348. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Per Capita 
Consumption of Major Food Commodities:  1980 to 2009, CENSUS tbl.217 (2012), 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0217.pdf. 
 349. See Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1263 (E.D. Pa. 
1987). 
 350. See FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 351. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 659 F. Supp. 1129, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 352. See Nestle Holdings, Inc., et al., Analysis To Aid Public Comment, 68 Fed. Reg. 
39,564 (July 2, 2003).  
 353. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 43–44. 
 354. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain:  Lessons from 
the Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 409 (2005) (“Realism cautions that federal and 
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courts cannot limit competition policy to those industries that they believe 
provide healthy and useful products. 
Nonetheless, reconciling a consumer surplus goal with other societal 
objectives can be difficult.  When the FTC challenged a tobacco merger, 
one district court struggled: 
The Commission’s action in this case appears anomalous when 
juxtaposed to other government efforts respecting tobacco sales in the 
United States.  In recent years, the government has made every effort to 
stem the consumption of tobacco by the public.  The government 
specifically has sought to discourage consumption by increasing the 
prices of tobacco products through taxes, regulating tobacco advertising, 
and decreasing the amount of shelf space devoted to tobacco products at 
stores.  Here, by contrast, the FTC has vigorously and successfully 
opposed an acquisition of a chewing tobacco product on the basis that it 
will result in anticompetitive effects and price increases.  This effort by 
the government therefore appears to be incoherent with its other efforts 
respecting tobacco.  At the same time, the Court appreciates the 
Commission’s explanation that if the acquisition is permitted then 
consumption of loose leaf will not decline.  Rather, consumers will 
simply be paying more for that consumption.  And even if the defendants 
were correct on their arguments that significant substitution would result, 
consumption would merely switch from loose leaf to moist snuff.  Thus, 
there is ultimately no public health benefit to permitting the 
acquisition.355 
Consumers nonetheless may desire less consumer surplus, such as smokers 
with imperfect willpower who favor a sin tax on tobacco.356 
Second, maximizing consumer surplus is a questionable, and arguably a 
counterproductive, antitrust objective for status goods where consumers 
want high prices (at least for others) to signal conspicuous consumption.357  
While consumers may prefer getting the Hermes scarf at a discount, they 
would not want the scarf to become affordable for most Americans.358 
Third, the aim of promoting consumer surplus can devolve into 
promoting materialism, which does not promote well-being.359  For 
essential goods and services, such as basic foods, medication, etc., a lower 
 
state antitrust authorities are unlikely to embrace anticompetitive conduct creating positive 
social welfare effects in net-harm industries. The ideology of competition may be too firmly 
engrained to permit such a radical paradigm shift without a legislative nudge.”). 
 355. FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 153–54 n.1 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 356. Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 331, at 35–36 (summarizing one study where “a 
50-cent tax per pack of cigarettes would leave predicted smokers with the same level of 
happiness as those who are not predicted to smoke in the United States”); see also FREY, 
supra note 12, at 9–10; Huang, Happiness Studies, supra note 13, at 21.12. 
 357. See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?:  Competition Policy 
and the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 (2010); Barak Y. 
Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia:  The Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 261, 286 
(2008). 
 358. VEBLEN, supra note 150, at 26 (observing that the predominant motive for 
conspicuous consumption is the “invidious distinction attaching to wealth”). 
 359. Stucke, supra note 357, at 946–47. 
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price can translate into greater savings, wealth, and better health, enabling 
consumers to work less, retire earlier, or donate more.  But that logic does 
not extend to all discretionary goods and services.  Materialism eventually 
attaches to a competition policy that seeks to promote consumer surplus for 
discretionary purchases.  The belief is that as consumer surplus increases, 
consumers can buy more things, and their well-being increases accordingly.  
But as the happiness literature examines, people “who prize material goods 
more highly than other values in life tend to be substantially less happy.”360  
One 2007 survey found “a somewhat inconsistent but generally rather 
dismal picture of materialists and individuals who aspire to financial 
success.”361  Materialism or financial aspirations were positively correlated 
with neuroticism, anxiety, self-criticism, depression, anger expression, 
emotional instability, stress, conformity, Machiavellianism, right-wing 
authoritarianism, abrasiveness, and hedonistic values.362 
Fourth, promoting materialism can promote status competition, 
selfishness, and envy, and marginalize quality-of-life factors correlated with 
greater well-being.  For many, well-being extends beyond satisfying one’s 
desires to include a moral life.  On an individual level, well-being is 
positively correlated with family relationships, employment, community 
and friends, health, self-control or autonomy, personal ethical and moral 
values, and the quality of the environment.363  Prosocial spending is also 
associated with greater well-being.364  Materialism and financial 
aspirations, on the other hand, were negatively correlated with social 
interest (care and concern for others, friendliness, empathy), agreeableness, 
self-esteem, self-actualization, intelligence, religious values, family oriented 
values, environmentalism, and aesthetic values.365  Individuals primed with 
luxury goods, one study found, were more likely to think of themselves 
than others and were “significantly more likely to endorse production of a 
new car that might pollute the environment, . . . launch a new software with 
bugs, . . . and market a video game that might induce violence.”366  Trading 
off social relations for consuming more goods, and an increase in status 
 
 360. FREY, supra note 12, at 29. See generally M. Joseph Sirgy, Materialism and Quality 
of Life, 43 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 227 (1998). 
 361. Carol Nickerson et al., Financial Aspirations, Financial Success, and Overall Life 
Satisfaction:  Who? and How?, 8 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 467, 469 (2007). 
 362. Id. at 469–74. 
 363. BOK, supra note 12, at 17; LAYARD, supra note 12, at 62–73; NETTLE, supra note 12, 
at 85, 87. 
 364. Lara B. Aknin et al., Prosocial Spending and Well-Being:  Cross-cultural Evidence 
for a Psychological Universal 8, 13 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 11-038, 2010), 
available at www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-038.pdf (observing a positive relationship in 
prosocial spending and subjective well-being in 122 of 136 surveyed countries and in an 
experiment involving Canadians and Ugandans). 
 365. Nickerson et al., supra note 361, at 469–74. 
 366. Roy Y.J. Chua & Xi Zou, The Devil Wears Prada?  Effects of Exposure to Luxury 
Goods on Cognition and Decision Making 6 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 10-034) 
(2009), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-034.pdf (luxury 
primed participants watched ads for a diamond watch and leather oxford shoes and 
completed a questionnaire). 
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competition at the cost of reducing social relations, can decrease well-
being.367  Materialism is detrimental not only to the individual, but society.  
“A consumption culture” is negatively related to concern for the 
environment; participation in public domain issues; and involvement in 
family, community, and social issues.368  A competition policy, whose 
primary purpose is to promote lower prices and greater output of goods and 
services can also conflict with other policies that seek to improve quality of 
life.  Sustainability issues arise from increased energy consumption, waste, 
and environmental degradation. 
Fifth, even if people experienced greater happiness when purchasing 
additional material goods, that happiness, at least on a day-to-day 
experienced basis, is likely to be short-lived.369  Individuals adapt to higher 
incomes (and increased consumer surplus) and have greater income 
aspirations.370  Winners of large amounts of money in lotteries, for 
example, have a temporary boost in experienced well-being.371  Individuals 
may desire more goods and services but, after obtaining them, they become 
preoccupied with obtaining other goods and services.372 
Sixth, if many view consumer surplus in relative terms (how much 
additional surplus they have relative to their peers) rather than absolute 
terms (how much wealth they have), it is questionable that people derive 
greater well-being from greater consumer surplus.373  People often have 
reference-based utility.374  They do not care solely about absolute levels of 
 
 367. Pugno, supra note 71, at 592–95 (providing economic model); id. at 595–97 
(empirical illustration); see also James A. Roberts & Aimee Clement, Materialism and 
Satisfaction with Over-All Quality of Life and Eight Life Domains, 82 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 
79 (2007). 
 368. Roberts & Clement, supra note 367, at 82. 
 369. FREY, supra note 12, at 40; Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909–10. 
 370. FREY, supra note 12, at xi; Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 65, at 168. 
 371. NETTLE, supra note 12, at 75.  Even people with acquired disabilities or health 
problems show considerable, but not always complete, adaptation to happiness. Id. at 83. 
 372. NETTLE, supra note 12, at 76–77; Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909–10. 
 373. TURNER, supra note 329, at 16 (noting that the “implicit assumption of any simply 
presented marginal-utility curve—that my utility is a function of my income alone—is 
clearly wrong.  My utility is clearly also a function of other people’s income and of my 
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experiment examined whether the fear of losing the social competition inherent in an auction 
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wealth or personal consumption but also about changes in their wealth and 
consumption relative to others.375  One’s total income is less important than 
how much one earns relative to one’s peers, neighbors, friends, or, as H.L. 
Mencken observed, one’s wife’s sister’s husband.376  People compare 
themselves to the wealth and consumption of their peers and the 
socioeconomic class immediately above them; after adapting to the higher 
rung, they strive for more.377   
Seventh, increasing consumer surplus for some goods and services does 
not necessarily increase total well-being when consumers use that surplus to 
compete for goods and services in short supply.378  If consumers, for 
example, use their extra wealth to compete for holiday vacation lodgings 
and restaurants, they are not necessarily happier.  They either have to pay 
more than others for a quieter beachfront experience or accept the cheaper, 
albeit noisier and crowded, beach.379  Increasing surplus can also increase 
consumption that increases negative externalities.  As anyone caught in 
Beijing traffic knows, the increasing availability of vehicles can decrease 
well-being with longer commute times and poorer air quality. 
Eighth, the behavioral economics literature further draws into question 
consumer surplus as a normative goal.  Professor Kirkwood, for example, 
discusses how competition policy protects consumers and small suppliers 
from wealth transfers arising from anticompetitive conduct.  But 
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competition policy is not about maximizing consumer surplus per se but 
promoting fairness.380  Citizens value fairness.  “A basic rule of fairness,” 
Kahneman and others found, “is that the exploitation of market power to 
impose losses on others is unacceptable.”381  The behavioral economics 
literature suggests that “framing effects” (how the issue is worded or 
framed) do matter.382  Consumers typically base fairness on the deviation 
from an established reference point.383  Deviations from the perceived 
reference point are marked by asymmetric price elasticity, whereby many 
are more sensitive to price increases than price cuts.384 Losses hurt more 
than the joy from comparable gains, and whether the price change is coded 
as a loss or gain affects fairness determinations.385  Thus, the fairness 
concerns that animate competition policy are not simply about maximizing 
consumer surplus by keeping prices low—a less important goal in a 
developed economy.  Rather, competition policy is about protecting 
consumers from the exploitation of increased market power, which is often 
seen as a departure from moral or social norms or other established 
reference points.386  So, many consumers do not begrudge the monopoly 
that charges more for a better product.  But they do complain when the 
firm, whether by merger or exit by its rivals, becomes the corporate bully.  
The monopsony employer that cuts its workers pay affects well-being far 
more than a comparable pay increase would.  By preventing such 
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anticompetitive behavior, competition policy does not necessarily promote 
lower prices per se, but our perceptions of a just or fair society.387  
Accordingly, if consumer surplus increases in an already wealthy 
economy, then many people, aside from the lower-income and poor, will 
unlikely be happier as a result.388  If the consumer surplus is distributed 
unevenly and greater wealth inequality ensues, the wealthier may have 
greater life satisfaction but not necessarily greater experienced day-to-day 
happiness.389  Plus, as Part III.D discusses, there will be greater incentives 
for the wealthy to use the law to safeguard and augment their interests, 
which can reduce total well-being.390 
3.  Why Lowering Gas Prices May Not Increase Well-Being. 
One response is that if consumer surplus does not improve well-being, 
why do many consumers bargain and shop for discounts?391  Why else do 
consumers queue late Thanksgiving evening outside department stores?  
Why else do gasoline prices “exert an unrivaled hold on the public 
imagination”?392  The rise in gasoline prices played a greater role in the 
2012 U.S. presidential debates393 than antitrust policy.  So wouldn’t 
consumers be happier if the DOJ prosecuted the OPEC cartel and lower gas 
prices resulted? 
As The New York Times reports, “there is surprisingly little evidence that 
gas prices deserve an outsize reputation for economic and political 
influence.”394  One study found that gas prices were inversely related with 
life satisfaction.395  But this dissatisfaction was short-lived; life satisfaction, 
the study found, largely rebounded a year later.396 So why aren’t Americans 
necessarily happier when they pay $2.00 per gallon rather than $3.50?397 
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The happiness literature discusses how people at times inaccurately 
predict (1) the impact of future life events on their well-being (such as a 
junior professor’s prediction if denied tenure);398 (2) their adaptation to 
their new condition (whether a physical disability or winning the lottery);399 
and (3) the strong effects of relative rather than absolute wealth on 
satisfaction. 
Behavioral economists describe this “focusing illusion” in pursuing 
happiness as the fact that “[n]othing that you focus on will make as much 
difference as you think.”400  One example of this bias came from a recent 
experiment, which reaffirmed that “[t]here is more happiness in giving than 
in receiving.”401  First, the study’s authors found from a nationally 
representative survey that personal spending was unrelated to happiness but 
spending more of one’s income on others predicted greater happiness.402  
Higher prosocial spending (e.g., gifts for others and donations to charity) 
was associated with significantly greater happiness.403 The study’s authors 
next performed a before-and-after field study of employees who received a 
profit-sharing bonus.  They found that “employees who devoted more of 
their bonus to pro-social spending experienced greater happiness after 
receiving the bonus, and the manner in which they spent that bonus was a 
more important predictor of their happiness than the size of the bonus 
itself.”404  In a third experiment, participants, after rating their happiness in 
the morning, were given an envelope containing money (either five dollars 
or twenty dollars) and were told to spend the money by 5:00 p.m. that 
day.405  In one group, participants were told to spend the money on 
themselves; the second group was told to spend the money on someone else 
or give it to a charity.  After 5:00 p.m. the participants were asked about 
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their happiness.  Although the amount of money the participants received 
(five dollars or twenty dollars) did not have a significant effect on their 
happiness, participants who gave the money away reported greater post-
windfall happiness than did participants who spent it on themselves.406  So 
if giving leads to greater happiness, the study’s authors ask, why don’t we 
spend a little less on ourselves and donate a little more?407  People predict 
poorly.  The authors found that 63 percent of the university students 
predicted personal spending would make them happier than prosocial 
spending, and that twenty dollars would make them happier than five 
dollars.408 
Consequently, a competition policy whose sole or primary aim is to 
promote consumer welfare by increasing consumer surplus will not 
necessarily promote a wealthy society’s total well-being.  Indeed, a 
competition policy that promotes materialism and a consumption culture 
will likely reduce, rather than increase, well-being.  Moreover, if antitrust’s 
sole aim is to promote consumer surplus, it is hard to envision competition 
law as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and as “important to the 
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill 
of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”409  
Rather, competition policy, under a consumer surplus goal, is simply a 
costly coupon program.  If antitrust’s objectives are to reduce the price of 
discretionary goods, some of which are harmful to consumers, there is little 
to celebrate over the policy’s efforts.  As John Kenneth Galbraith observed, 
“Growth consists increasingly of items of luxury consumption.  Thus we 
perform the considerable feat of converting the enjoyment of luxury into an 
index of national virtue.  This arouses at least some doubts.”410 
D.  Reweighing Competition Policy’s Political, Social, and Moral Goals 
As Part III.A examined, competition policy never arose to promote only 
one economic objective, such as consumer surplus.  Competition policy 
historically sought to promote political, social, and moral values of fair 
competition, dispersal of economic power, and promoting economic 
opportunity and individual autonomy.  Despite the historical concerns about 
concentrated economic power, antitrust analysis over the past thirty years 
overstated the importance of competitive dynamics that were easier to 
assess (productive efficiencies and short-term price effects) and 
marginalized or ignored what was harder to assess (dynamic efficiencies; 
systemic risk; and the political, social, and moral implications of 
concentrated economic power).  Americans, as Part III.B discussed, paid the 
price.  One benefit of the happiness literature, as Part III.C discussed, is 
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exposing why a competition policy that seeks primarily to promote 
consumer surplus is unlikely to increase total well-being. 
Thus, we return full circle and recognize that competition policy, if it 
seeks to promote total well-being, cannot maximize one narrow dimension.  
Antitrust’s moral, social, and political values, which Congress emphasized, 
must return to the analysis.  On a positive note, the agencies acknowledge 
in their latest merger guidelines the incipiency standard.411  Moreover, the 
agencies, under the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, “may challenge 
mergers that in their judgment pose a real danger of harm through 
coordinated effects, even without specific evidence showing precisely how 
the coordination likely would take place.”412  But the risk remains that 
courts and policymakers will demand proof of how the merger will lessen 
competition, with a myopic concern over post-merger unilateral price 
effects.  Others, acknowledging antitrust’s noneconomic concerns, are 
unsure how to weigh these values relative to lower prices and greater 
output. 
A potential benefit from the happiness literature is in assessing the value 
(in terms of gained or lost well-being) of nonmarket, nonmaterial 
experiences, activities, and conditions—such as autonomy, the right to vote, 
and the degree of political representation.413  The happiness economics 
literature is beginning to examine the relationship between well-being and 
the political and economic institutions’ inclusiveness. The happiness 
literature, while not there yet, may help policymakers down the road assess 
the relative importance of antitrust’s noneconomic values in promoting total 
well-being.  Policymakers, after all, were originally interested in the 
happiness literature as a way to supplement GDP measures in assessing a 
country’s economic performance.414  As the OECD and other governmental 
and private institutions collect data, policymakers may eventually assess the 
importance of antitrust’s noneconomic values in several ways. 
One way is to assess how, and the extent to which, a well-functioning 
democracy promotes well-being, and then assess how competition law’s 
economic and noneconomic values promote a democracy.  The United 
States, after all, was founded on the premise that democracy can promote 
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happiness.415  As Professor Bok observed, “almost all the countries in the 
world that rank highest in overall satisfaction with life have been successful 
democracies for more than 80 years.”416  One study found that 
improvements in the level of democracy between 1988 and 1998 coincided 
with a statistically significant increase in well-being: 
[D]irect democratic participation rights have been found to be positively 
related with citizens’ well-being. . . .  For the case of Switzerland, people 
in cantons with more extensive rights to propose popular initiatives and to 
vote on major laws and constitutional amendments report higher 
satisfaction with life, many other influences on satisfaction being held 
constant.  This is interpreted as being attributable to the fact that the 
outcomes of this kind of political process are more beneficial to the 
population, because politicians are more strongly induced to follow 
voters’ wishes than is the case in a more indirect democracy or a non-
democracy.  In addition, a comparison between Swiss citizens (who have 
the right to vote) and foreigners living in Switzerland (who do not have 
that right but share in the outcomes) shows that citizens value the 
possibility of political participation, irrespective of outcomes, i.e. they 
derive procedural well-being from their participation rights.417 
The happiness literature is less developed on the optimal political 
institutions that foster a democracy that promotes overall well-being.418  
Yet one fundamental belief of any democracy is the value of civic 
engagement and responsive governance in promoting well-being.  Public 
confidence in government “is essential for social stability and the 
functioning of democracy. . . . and for economic growth.”419  So well-being 
is derived from both the government’s responsiveness to its citizens’ 
concerns and the governmental institutions themselves. 
As the happiness literature develops, it can assess the countries’ optimal 
legal and informal institutions that promote a well-functioning democracy, 
as well as the role of competition policy.  Congress has repeatedly 
recognized that democracies function better when economic and political 
power is dispersed.  As Aristotle wrote, “[T]he best form of political 
association is one where power is vested in the middle class, and, secondly, 
that good government is attainable in those cities where there is a large 
middle class—large enough . . . [to] prevent either of the opposing extremes 
from becoming dominant.”420  So, too, according to one recent economic 
analysis, countries prosper economically when legal institutions disperse 
political and economic power.421  First, extractive institutions have more to 
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fear from creative destruction.422  Although the elites prefer some economic 
growth from which to extract wealth, creative destruction, while promoting 
innovation, also can destabilize the entrenched power.423  The elites will 
sacrifice dynamic economic growth when it threatens their power.424  
Moreover, there is less incentive to innovate if the politically and 
economically powerful appropriate the gains.425  When the highly coveted 
economic and political power is concentrated in extractive institutions, 
political instability increases, as outside groups seek to displace the 
entrenched (not necessarily to promote more inclusive political and 
economic institutions but to expropriate the gains themselves).426   
Consequently, competition policy can promote an inclusive economy that 
promotes well-being.  As the MIT and Harvard economists have observed, 
[T]he presence of markets is not by itself a guarantee of inclusive 
institutions.  Markets can be dominated by a few firms, charging 
exorbitant prices and blocking the entry of more efficient rivals and new 
technologies.  Markets, left to their own devices, can cease to be 
inclusive, becoming increasingly dominated by the economically and 
politically powerful.  Inclusive economic institutions require not just 
markets, but inclusive markets that create a level playing field and 
economic opportunities for the majority of the people.  Widespread 
monopoly, backed by the political power of the elite, contradicts this.427 
Second, policymakers can assess the extent to which dispersed economic 
and political power, besides promoting democracy, promotes well-being 
directly.  The happiness research suggests that “decentralized political 
decisions raise life satisfaction . . . .  Individuals feel better at ease and 
better informed when decisions affecting local issues are decided at a local 
level rather than by a centralized government unit sometimes far from the 
issues at stake.”428  The happiness literature also finds that well-being is 
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strongly correlated with political freedom (more so in wealthier 
countries)429 and economic freedom (more so in less developed 
countries).430 
Competition “is first and foremost a system of decentralized economic 
power.”431  Competition policy can maintain a competitive market structure 
by, inter alia, lessening regulatory entry barriers, enjoining mergers to 
monopoly, and arresting trends toward concentration at their incipiency.  In 
doing so, antitrust’s structural remedies disperse not only economic power 
but political power with fewer monopolies to regulate and less rents to 
capture.432  As Dr. Kahn stated, the “essential task of public policy in a free 
enterprise system should be to preserve the framework of a fair field and no 
favors, letting the results take care of themselves.”433  I do not contend that 
increasing competition always increases well-being.  As I discuss 
elsewhere, competition does not always benefit society.  Greater 
competition, at times, yields more behavioral exploitation of consumers, 
greater waste from lobbying (and small businesses can be politically 
powerful, at times more so than large corporations), and more unethical 
behavior.434  Competition can produce more instability, bankruptcies, and 
anxiety, which in turn cause greater unhappiness.  
Although competition at times can increase misery, the relative 
unhappiness of citizens in centrally planned economies suggest that the 
economic freedom and opportunity available in competitive markets are 
better alternatives.  Misery and pauperism are associated more often with 
monopolies than competitive markets.435  The principal evil of monopolies 
 
 429. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 423 (“Political freedom measures the possibility 
for citizens to engage in the democratic process or, conversely, the restrictions on political 
participation.  It is composed of two sub-indices, the first relating to civil rights, such as 
freedom of speech (with eleven items), and the second to political rights (nine items).”). 
 430. Id. (Economic freedom “measures the opportunity for individuals to engage in the 
free exchange of goods, services, and labor. It is based on sub-indices (each in turn 
composed of a number of items), referring to the security of money, free enterprise, freedom 
from excessive taxation, and the possibility of undertaking monetary transfers.”). 
 431. ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 174, at 98. 
 432. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., and Vasileios 
Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
36th Economic Policy Symposium:  The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2012/ah.pdf. 
 433. Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28, 39 (1953). 
Ordoliberal legal scholar Franz Böhm, when working on the concept of 
“Leistungswettbewerb,” used as a central tenet that the rules for this market game should be 
shaped so that only the quality of performance (merit) should determine market success. 
Kerber, supra note 36, at 21. 
 434. Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2157193.  
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historically was their “interference with the liberty of the subject to pursue 
for his maintenance and that of his family any lawful trade or employment,” 
a liberty “assumed to be the natural right of every Englishman.”436 
Other factors also suggest that an unconcentrated marketplace promotes 
well-being.  A competitive market structure promotes economic opportunity 
and personal autonomy437—a key predictor of well-being.438  Citizens can 
choose to purchase from (and work for) firms that align with their personal 
religious and ethical values.439  When a firm engages in exploitative, unfair 
behavior, a competitive market provides alternatives.440 A competitive 
labor market provides workers the opportunity “to fulfill their own 
ambitions, to develop skills and abilities, to feel useful in society and to 
build self-esteem.”441 Likewise, positive sum competition enables richer 
social connections.  People can use their personal “vigor, imagination, 
devotion, and ingenuity” to help others.442  Thus, a competitive 
marketplace, in dispersing economic and political power, can foster 
activities, which are correlated generally with healthier and happier people.  
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Third, policymakers, using advances in the happiness literature, can 
assess how the quality of governmental institutions can promote well-being 
and the extent to which competition policy is aligned with these quality 
metrics.  Well-being is correlated with the “observance of the rule of law, 
efficient governmental agencies, a low level of violence and corruption, a 
high degree of trust in public officials (especially the police), and 
responsive encounters by citizens with public agencies and officials.”443  
Thus, policymakers can assess whether their antitrust legal standards are 
closely aligned with the rule of law, the independence of the agencies and 
courts from rent-seeking and corruption, and the public’s trust in their 
antitrust enforcers and courts. 
Fourth, economists can use the happiness literature’s econometric tools 
to assess directly the correlation between a jurisdiction’s antitrust 
enforcement and its citizens’ well-being.  Assessing the benefits or harms 
from competition policy is difficult.  The typical assessments are estimates 
of how much consumers overpaid for products or services from a 
conspiracy, or the innovations in the industry after a monopoly, such as 
AT&T, was broken up. Researchers, however, would have several 
challenges in estimating the correlation between antitrust enforcement and 
subjective well-being. Determining whether a country has a competition 
law is easy.  But assessing the nature of antitrust enforcement is more 
difficult.444  One cannot assume that more enforcement activity necessarily 
means a more effective competition policy.  Also, it may be difficult to 
disentangle antitrust from other factors that promote well-being.  An 
effective antitrust enforcement program typically requires other important 
democratic institutions that correlate with well-being, such as low 
corruption, an efficient and independent judiciary, the rule of law, 
representation, etc.  But one reason that these other legal institutions 
function effectively is because economic power is dispersed, due to an 
effective competition policy. 
Finally, the happiness literature can help policymakers address 
competition policy’s inherent tradeoffs.  In many instances, such as 
preventing a merger to monopoly, antitrust enforcement advances the law’s 
economic, social, political, and moral goals.  But competition policy at 
times involves tradeoffs, including (1) mergers, whose efficiencies benefit 
the company, with little prospect of being passed along to downstream 
consumers; (2) increases in interbrand competition at the expense of 
reducing intrabrand competition; (3) mergers with anticompetitive effects in 
one market offset by procompetitive benefits in another market; (4) mergers 
and restraints that yield dynamic efficiencies but also higher supra-
competitive prices; (5) mergers that yield greater productive efficiencies but 
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reduce product variety; and (6) mergers that yield productive efficiencies 
but increase systemic risk and the competitive distortions of firms too big 
and too integral to fail.445  Nor does one avoid these tradeoffs with an 
economic goal such as consumer welfare, since mergers and restraints at 
times benefit some consumers while harming others.446 Similarly, well-
being raises its own trade-off issues (such as a restraint that increases some 
people’s well-being at the expense of others).  But if policymakers adopt a 
utilitarian approach, the happiness literature can help inform these trade-
offs.  The literature, for example, examines the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation in calculating a misery index.447  If both 
inflation and unemployment affect one’s happiness, the happiness 
economics studies seek to estimate their magnitudes:  “[H]ow much 
unemployment is equal to a percentage point of higher inflation, or vice 
versa.”448 
Consequently, the happiness literature can help policymakers assess in a 
post-materialistic society the importance of antitrust’s noneconomic values 
relative to economic values, such as minimizing deadweight welfare loss. 
But even if the happiness literature down the road cannot assess the 
relationship between effective antitrust enforcement and well-being, the 
literature today already draws into question the framework used over the 
past thirty years to guide U.S. antitrust policy.  The happiness literature 
provides another important metric to assess competition policy’s political, 
social, and moral values, which have been degraded over the years.  In 
short, to promote overall well-being, any competition policy in a developed 
economy must include both material well-being and quality-of-life factors. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts and enforcers should not constrict competition policy to narrow 
economic goals (such as promoting consumer surplus or reducing 
deadweight welfare loss).  Doing so contravenes Congress’s intent and our 
democratic values, such as dispersing economic power.  Nor should courts 
and enforcers in their antitrust review conflate what is easier to measure 
(such as a merger’s impact on short-term pricing) with what is important.  
After the economic crisis, competition policy’s political, social, and moral 
concerns of concentrated economic and political power, while not easily 
measureable, cannot be ignored. 
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The current discontent over the imbalance in economic and political 
power is worrisome.  Democracies cannot thrive with the current wealth 
and income inequality, social immobility, and distrust of our bloated 
unresponsive federal bureaucracy.  The United States cannot continue to 
shed its fundamental civic, ethical, and moral values along its path from an 
inclusive to extractive economy.  Our economy generally, and competition 
policy specifically, can and should deliver more than the mindless pursuit 
of accumulating cheap products.  As Galbraith wrote, “Economic 
development enables us to pay the price; it is why we have development.  
We do not have development in order to make our surroundings more 
hideous, our culture more meretricious or our lives less complete.”449 
Now is time for the agencies and courts to reinvigorate competition 
policy.  For starters they must reincorporate competition law’s political, 
social, and moral objectives into simpler legal presumptions, which the 
Court once did with its incipiency standard.  Greater consumer surplus, 
greater productive efficiency, and less deadweight welfare loss are 
important objectives but are hardly determinative in well-developed, post-
industrial economies like the United States.  Consumer surplus should be 
viewed, not as the aim of competition policy, but instead as one incidental 
byproduct of a competitive process that promotes economic opportunity and 
freedom.450  Political, social, and moral values play as large a role, if not 
larger, in promoting a sustainable, inclusive economy that increases the 
well-being of the many, rather than the few. 
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